Book Review: Randall Stone's "Lending Credibility"

Randall Stone’s Lending Credibility: A Review and Critique

Introduction
The extent to which the IMF is a benefit or a detriment to countries trying to develop is one of the defining debates in international political economy. Randall Stone’s Lending Credibility: the International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition is yet another attempt to explore this issue. For Stone, while the IMF makes mistakes along the way, the lending institution is ultimately beneficial to countries trying to escape the trap of underdevelopment (Stone 2002: 2). In particular, the IMF’s inflationary advice – that controlling inflation is the most critical determinant for long-term growth – showed positive results in places like Poland and Bulgaria. This essay will review the main aspects of Stone’s Lending Credibility, before situating his work in other relevant IMF literature and highlighting some possible objections to his work. In short I argue that Stone’s book is an important contribution to the field by exploring the nexus between international and domestic politics, as well studying more closely inflationary policy. However, his book is not without its share of flaws. The latter section will address these concerns.
Lending Credibility: A Short Review
Stone set out to prove that international institutions do influence – in many ways positively influence – actors that choose to pursue the strategies advocated by such bodies as the IMF. For Stone, the literature on the IMF was overly negative, overly positive or generally ambiguous about the role these institutions play in spurring growth and development (Stone 2002: 39). Moreover, much of the literature had either neglected or misinterpreted the function that inflationary policies played with IMF. For example, many scholars on the left argued that the IMF was too concerned with controlling inflation, rather than looking out for the needs of the poor (Stone 2002: 6). But Stone claims that the poor are the people most ravaged by high inflation. “It was the poor,” Stone posited, “rather than the wealthy who suffered most from inflation” (Stone 2002: 7). Moreover, controlling inflation was critical for laying the groundwork for a successful economy: it increased incentives for investment, promoted confidence among foreign investors and led to better wealth distribution (Stone 2002: 8-9).
Stone set out several hypotheses before engaging in a game-theoretic analysis to understand the relationship between the IMF and post-Communist transitions.[1] First, the IMF’s enforcement mechanism is more likely to punish smaller countries than larger countries for violating fund conditionalities. When larger countries are punished they are subjected to short punishments, “because the threat of longer punishments is not credible” (Stone 2002: 59). Second, IMF intervention does influence the economic choices of the states involved. The IMF has effect depending on the credibility of the threat that they will withhold financing from countries that do not comply with fund rules. Lastly, capital markets are aware of IMF signals. When the IMF is involved capital markets assume that conditionalities will be enforced, and the IMF will make responsible economic decisions concerning exchange rates and foreign currency (Stone 2002: 26-27). In testing these specific hypotheses, Stone not only hoped to show that the IMF did influence economic choices but he also sought to explain why variation existed among states that took on IMF conditions (Stone 2002: 81). Why did Poland do better economically than, say, Russia?
The conclusions Stone garnered generally agreed with his initial hypotheses. State size and influence does matter when it comes to who gets punished and for how long. Therefore, Poland’s response to IMF conditionalities varied in comparison to Russia or Ukraine. When Poland missed its targets in 1991 and 1992 the IMF responded immediately by suspending programs and funding to Poland (Stone 2002: 115). Stone suggested this was to Poland’s benefit. With respect to the Russian case, on the other hand, the IMF had trouble credibly forcing Russia to comply with its targets. As a result, Russia had a tremendously difficult time accomplishing anything economically (Stone 2002: 166-167). Stone’s argument goes as follows: Because Russia and Ukraine were “influential” countries – receiving direct aid -- the United States was more likely to soften the demands on Russian leaders in meeting the targets of the IMF (Stone 2002: 119). Both Bush and Clinton administrations asked the IMF the forgo some of the conditions on Russia and chose to rally other Western governments to their aid (Stone 2002: 124). With respect to Ukraine, Stone argued that as Ukraine moved closer to the United States their commitment to the IMF programs waned. Poland and Bulgaria, what we might call the success stories, had a limited relationship with American political elites.
Secondly, the role of IMF influence, generally speaking, does positively impact rates of inflation and better adjusts post-Communist countries to withstand financial markets. As Stone argued, “the over all thrust of the IMF advice was sound: prioritize the fight against inflation” (Stone 2002: 233). Lastly, capital markets are also affected by the IMF and there is some relationship – although the relationship is not as statistically significant – between the success of the IMF and movement of capital goods.
In short, Stone’s book is an important contribution to the growing literature that argues whether or not the IMF matters, and if it does how it matters. Stone tries to keep some distance from the variable he studied, however, trying not to become a cheerleader for the IMF. Instead, he finds that depending on the size and influence of the state and the extent to which the state controls inflation will be the ultimate determinant of whether or not a country becomes an IMF showcase. In general he believes that if countries follow IMF advice then those countries will benefit economically. In the case of Poland, Stone’s success story, this occurred. Russia, meanwhile, had a more difficult time developing their economy following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Lending Credibility is an important contribution to the literature on two other fronts as well. First, Stone does a good job of showing the connection between external actors and domestic politics.[2] The effectiveness of the IMF depends both on the responsiveness and credibility of the IMF but also on how domestic actors interact and take seriously the calls for reform from the fund. For years, IR Scholars have called for a further exploration of the connection between domestic politics and the international system but in some cases to no avail (See Putnam 1988). Rawi Abdelal’s National Purpose tries to explain the economic development of Eastern Europe as a product of nationalism, but Abdelal largely ignores the international system (See Abdelal 2001). Other scholars, like Jeffery Sachs, tend to ignore the domestic realm altogether and instead focus solely on the IMF and World Bank (See Sachs 2005). Stone corrects this. Second, Stone focuses his lens on one aspect of the IMF program – the policies relating to inflation. Too often political scientists treat institutions as wholes without examining some of their working parts. Stone isolates his work to examine inflationary policy in particular and found that one recommendation from the IMF must be heeded: control inflation.
Reassessing Stone: Some Critiques
Devesh Kapur, a general critic of IMF programs, has argued that if the IMF had a dollar “for every criticism of its purpose,” that they would never have to go to their shareholders for more money (Kapur 1998: 54). Kapur’s arguments are the standard response from critics of the IMF: that IMF programs inevitably hurt the poor; that the fund places blame for the failure of the programs on debtor countries; and that debtor countries do not set the terms at which they are held to (Kapur 1998: 55-57). James Vreeland, in his important book The IMF and Economic Development, argued that there was a negative statistical relationship between the IMF and economic growth (Vreeland 2003: 8). The IMF also disproportionately hurt the poor and shifted income away from them (Vreeland 2003: 152). Stone tries to counter some of these criticisms in his book. He, of course, argues that the poor suffered because of the lack of IMF programs and the country’s failure to institute sound inflationary policy. However, like Vreeland, Stone only analyzes a few cases – Poland, Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria to prove his hypotheses. Vreeland and Stone’s results might just be a result of case selection rather than anything the fund did or did not do. As Vreeland criticizes in his book, only Professor Stone has found that the IMF does a good job at curtailing inflation (Vreeland 2003: 159). Perhaps it could be argued that there was something peculiar about the post-Communist situation rather than something innately effective in the IMF.
A second criticism of Stone’s book is his treatment of how the external environment operates within domestic politics. While I argued that exploring the nexus between the international system and domestic politics was an appropriate step, part of Stone’s research project was underdeveloped. When it comes to the IMF, Stone is precise in how the fund functions and works. However, Stone’s understanding of the domestic arena is limited. For example. Stone’s reasoning for why Russia failed is because Russia did not implement the IMF’s programs properly and because sectors of Russia’s economy were corrupt and ineffective (Stone 2002: 164). Ukraine was a hard task for the IMF because political and business elites were slow to break away from Russia and implement their own reforms. Thus Ukraine did nothing with respect to their economy in the early 1990s. (Stone 2002: 207-208). Bulgaria and Poland, on the other hand, had fractious political divides but IMF edicts were more consistently enforced and those countries saw the positive impact of IMF. This discussion about the domestic intricacies is puzzling though because Stone’s initial hypotheses – that it is easier to consistently enforce IMF edicts on small size states than large ones – would seem to make this detailed discussion of domestic politics moot. Whether Russian or Polish elites were corrupt (and some were), would seem to have little bearing on whether or not the IMF was successful per his argument. The argument was one about size and influence, and the IMF’s ability to punish, not about the extent to which political players were particularly adept or corrupt. If Stone’s argument is that size, influence, enforcement credibility, domestic actors and external actors all matter, we are left with little more than a kitchen sink model of development: everything matters just a little bit.
Third, Stone’s argument about state size and influence struck me as interesting given Stone’s affinities for the influence of international institutions in world politics. The emphasis on states as actors is generally attributable to the influence of realism and neorealism on international relations. As most realists related, states were the major actors in world politics and because of this, they believed that liberal institutionalists were overly optimistic about the importance of institutions (Grieco 2000: 12). Stone argues that although institutions like the IMF can influence states power does “constrain what the IMF can achieve” (Stone 2002: 2). Stone seems to largely sidestep one of the defining debates in IR by simply suggesting power and institutions both matter. This ultimately works against him because one of the central hypotheses of his work – that variation can be attributed to the size or influence of IMF countries – remains underdeveloped. Moreover, a hard-nosed realist might take Stone’s work as a classic example of how international institutions do not work because states with “size and influence” disregard them altogether.
Conclusions and Future Research Implications
Randall Stone’s work on post-Communist transitions in Eastern Europe is an important contribution not only to the field of IPE but also to the more narrow field of Slavic studies in general. His two most important contributions were showing how international institutions like the IMF intersect into domestic politics, as well as showing how focusing on just one aspect of the IMF program – inflationary policies – can benefit states that adopt those policies. But Stone is not without his flaws. One, Stone’s cases might be exceptions rather than the rule, as James Vreeland and others have tried to point out. Therefore Stone’s work is not very generalizable. Second, although Stone attempts to connect the domestic to the international, he does not quite pull it off. Instead, it seems as though he adopts a bit a of a kitchen-sink approach by casting in all variables, minor or not. This reduces the clarity and precision of his work. Lastly, Stone underdevelops this idea of “influence,” “size” and “power” in his work. It is admirable that he did not get mired down in the same old debates about realism and neoliberal institutionalism; however, there was some contradictions about what mattered most: power or institutions. He seemed to want to have it both ways.
A future book might apply Stone’s framework to more cases. Does the IMF do a good job in small states where the IMF stays committed to seeing that targets are met and programs are accomplished? Also, a future book might avoid post-Communist transitions, which in many ways were blank slates for IMF bureaucrats. In more established regimes would the results be different? A final suggestion for a future research agenda would be to do away with the macroeconomic indicators for growth and instead analyze the informal sector and the rise of business entrepreneurship in each country. The tendency in IPE is to focus on economic growth indices alone and then determine success or failure. The IMF is also certainly party to this. With a more microlevel analysis we might escape some of the same old arguments – whether the IMF is good or bad for example – and instead focus more on domestic actors in the world economy. This could open up future avenues for research as well.


[1] Stone lays out over nine different hypotheses that are tested by his formal model. I have narrowed these hypotheses to only three, which gives the reader a general overview of Stone’s work without laboring over every detail of every hypothesis. To analyze every hypothesis would take up more time and space than this paper would allow.
[2] As I reveal later in the essay I think he unfortunately underdevelops the connections between the two. It is a nice start but ultimately limited in some ways.

Does Globalization Undermine the State?

Have Europeanization and globalization eroded the autonomy of the state as a political unit?

Introduction

The political unit known as the state has received increased attention in political
science by scholars such as Skocpol, Tilly, Ertman and Pierson. This “statist” movement sought to correct the atomistic and agent-centered methodology of rational-choice that had come to dominate the discipline, and instead explored the structural influence of the state on politics. Thus when faced with the question of whether or not the process of Europeanization erodes the autonomy of the state, it is instructive to understand the state – institutionally and functionally. I will situate the literature on states (Weber, Tilly and Ertman) into the ongoing debate about Europeanization and globalization in comparative politics. Although Europeanization and globalization are two analytically distinct ideas, both are linked to the rise of capitalist markets, capital mobility, the fight against Communism, and changes that affect national policies and practices (Schmidt 2002: 41). This essay will address how state autonomy might be eroded in light of these pressures, but it also highlights how states retain their autonomy when the pressures to integrate seem overwhelming.

Weber, Tilly, Ertman and State Autonomy

Max Weber’s definition of the state has generally been the basis for which all scholars have explored the issue. For Weber, the state “is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1983: 111). Weber’s definition describes several institutional features of the state: differentiation of personnel, centrality of political relations, territorial demarcation and authoritative rule-making supported by violence (Mann 1986: 112). Although nation-states in Europe have retained most of these aspects, two in particular come into question with respect to Europeanization and globalization processes.

While the state retains its differentiation, the rise of Europeanization does put into question the centrality of political relations. For example, the neo-functionalist school has argued that integration involves processes that go beyond the state and occur between trade unions, political parties and interest groups (Verdun 2000: 28). As well, political decisions potentially reside in Brussels, undercutting the authority of member-states in the EU, NATO, or the monetary union. On the other hand, intergovernmentalists like Andrew Moravscik have claimed that the state still has “national preferences” and these state preferences precede European integration (Moravscik 1998: 242). National governments do not have to “swallow policies” they dislike and generally can integrate on their own terms (Hooghe and Marks 1998: 284). Secondly, Weber’s claim that state rule-making is backed up a monopoly on the use of violence comes into question. Although Western Europe for sometime has relied on a collaborative institution (NATO) for security, the inability of European states to cope with their territorial holdings could place state autonomy in the balance. Moreover, situations concerning migration, immigration, and a common defense program could potentially erode state autonomy.

Charles Tilly accepts Weber’s “contestable definition” of the state in light of the European state-making experience (Tilly 1990: 70). Tilly is less concerned, however, with describing the aspects of the state and more interested in how states in modern Europe formed. For Tilly, states were formed by making war against outside rivals, protecting the domestic population from those rivals and extracting resources from that population in order to finance wars and statemaking (Tilly 1990: 97). Each process reinforced the next, in some ways resembling what Tilly would call a mafia-like outfit – coercing someone to pay for their own protection.

Tilly’s piece is informative because it highlights how one political unit came to replace another. In this case, how states replaced empires, religious communities and city-states to become the exclusive political unit. A peculiarly European invention, the nation-state has been accepted by almost the entire world (Tilly 1990: 181). But it is not inconceivable that states could one day be replaced, and at the least, be undermined by large, amorphous international regimes like the European Union. The processes of Europeanization and globalization that potentially erode state autonomy have been anti-Tilly in some respects. Europeanization and globalization transform previous notions of territory by emphasizing monetary unions and free flow of capital goods rather than protecting boundaries by making war. In the case of the EU, Europeanization originated as a way to prevent war and encourage cooperation between the states (Story and Walter 1997: 4-5). But in other respects, the EU has used tactics similar to Tilly’s account to achieve consolidation. Prior to the Maastrict signing, there was a high degree of coercion and a specified set of rules to abide by among member-states in order to jibe with EU edicts (Schmidt 2002: 87). By allowing the coercion of Europeanization states could take a back seat to other political units.

Lastly, Thomas Ertman also examines state building in Europe but introduces a different perspective from Tilly that examines variation among different states. For Ertman, the role of representative institutions and local government play a large role in the statemaking process. Moreover, previous scholars sloppily mislabeled regime types, linking all absolutist regimes to bureaucracies and all constitutional regimes to parliamentary systems (Ertman 1997: 4-5). In fact, as Britain showed, there are bureaucratic constitutional regimes and in the case of Poland and Hungary, patrimonial constitutional regime types (Ertman 1997: 34).

Ertman’s argument is fascinating because it asks “statist” scholars to take seriously how states are different from one another in their domestic policies. Thus, the presence of Europeanization and globalization could very well reduce the autonomy of some states but have no effect on others. Vivien Schmidt notes the “varieties of capitalism” with a comparative glance at Britain, France and Germany. She argues that although there have been tremendous pressures on the countries by the processes of Europeanization and globalization this has not led to “convergence” into one type of capitalist system (Schmidt 2002: 5). Britain’s liberal market capitalism, France’s state capitalism and Germany’s corporatist capitalism produced different responses to the pressures of Europeanization. Britain adopted a policy of intertia, France a policy of transformation and Germany a policy of absorption (Schmidt 2002: 89). States retained the ability to decide themselves not to “swallow” pressures they deemed unsuitable.

Conclusion

This essay has tried to express the potential that Europeanization and globalization could have on eroding state autonomy. In doing so, I examined several works regarding the state and state formation. In some cases, the rise of Europeanization and globalization threaten the autonomy of states by undermining territorial boundaries, placing authority in the hands of non-state actors, and using coercion to keep states under the rubric of the European Union. But although erosion is possible, scholars like Moravscik and Schmidt cast some caution on this perspective by showing the influence of national governments. Each case proves the powerful impact Europeanization and globalization have on states

Notes on International Political Economy

Gilpin, Robert “Global Political Economy.” 2001

“Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has been the most outstanding characteristic of international economic affairs and, to a considerable extent, of political affairs as well” (3).

“This is still a world where national policies and domestic economies are the principal determinants of economic affairs” (3).

“…In the 1980s, the overseas expansion of multinational firms integrated national economies more and more completely” (4).

“…This book takes a consciously realist or state-centric approach to analysis of the international economy. Differing from many contemporary writing on the global economy, I believe that the nation-state remains the dominant actor in both domestic and international economic affairs” (4).

Reasons for expansion of global trade:

a) decline of trade barriers after trade negotiations

b) deregulation and privatization opened up national economies

c) significance of increased investment (mutual funds up)

d) increasing importance of MNCs

Some argue: “The collapse of the Soviet command economy, the failure of the Third World’s import-substitution strategy, and the outstanding success of the American economy in the 1990s have encouraged acceptance of unrestricted markets as the solution to the economic ills of modern society” (8).

Critics argue: “The high costs of economic globalization including growing income inequality both among and within nations, high chronic levels of unemployment in western Europe and elsewhere, and most of all environmental degradation…” (9).

Gilpin argues: “The idea that globalization is responsible for most of the world’s economic, political, and other problems is either patently false or greatly exaggerated” (9).

“Regionalization is not an alternative to the nation-state, as some believe, but rather embodies the efforts of individual states to collectively promote their vital national interests and ambitions” (11).

“Historical experience indicates that the purpose of economic activities is ultimately determined not only by markets and the prescriptions of technical economics, but also by the norms, values and interests of the social and political systems in which economic activities are embedded” (12).

“My own normative commitment is to economic liberalism; that is, to free trade and minimal barriers to the flow of goods, services and capital across national boundaries, although, under certain restricted circumstances, nationalist policies such as trade protection and industrial policy may be justified’ (14).

“The point, however…is that realism and nationalism are not identical. Nationalists may be realists, but realists are not necessarily nationalists” (15).

Global political economy: “the interaction of the market and such powerful actors as states, multinational firms and international organizations” (17).

“It is certainly true that economics and technological forces are profoundly reshaping international affairs and influencing the behavior of states. However, in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry” (21).

Polanyi, Karl. “The Great Transformation.” 1944.

“Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness” (3).

“The Nineteenth century produced a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of Western civilization, namely a hundred years peace – from 1814-1914” (5).

“The mere growth of wealth and population, or their decrease, is bound to set political forces in motion; and the external balance will invariably reflect the internal. Yet even an organized balance of power system can insure peace without the permanent threat of war only if it is able to act upon these internal factors directly and prevent imbalance in statu nascendi” (9).

“Yet the secret of the successful maintenance of general peace lay undoubtedly in the position, organization and techniques of international finance” (10).

The Rothschilds (wealthy capitalists): “They were anything but pacifists; they had made their fortune in the financing of wars; they were impervious to moral consideration; they had no objection to any number of minor, short or localized wars. But their businesses would be impaired if a general war between the great Powers should interfere with the monetary foundations of the system” (11).

“Haute finance, an institution sui generis, peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century functioned as the main link between the political and the economic organization of the world” (10).

Haute finance: no boundaries, not at all territorial

“Yet to the degree to which …it was actually independent of any single government, it was bale to serve a new interest , that had no specific organ of its own, for the service of which no other institution happened to be available, and which was nevertheless of vital importance to the community, namely peace’ (12).

“The chief danger, however, which stalked the capitalists of Europe was not technological or financial failure, but war – not a war between small countries (which could be easily isolated) nor war upon a small country by a Great Power (a frequent and often convenient occurrence), but a general war between the Great Powers themselves” (15).

“Trade was now dependent upon an international monetary system which could not function in general war. It demanded peace…” (16).

“The breakdown of the international gold standard was the invisible link between the disintegration of world economy which started at the turn of the century and the transformation of a whole civilization in the thirties” (21).

“The dissolution of the system of world economy which had been in progress since 1900 was responsible for the political tension that exploded in 1914; the outcome of the war and the treaties had eased the tension superficially by eliminating German competition while aggravating the causes of tension and thereby vastly increasing the political and economic impediments to peace” (22).

“The only viable solution of the burning problem of peace – balance of power – was completely out of reach” (22). All losers were disarmed, by the way.

“First among the statesmen of the time, Woodrow Wilson appears to have realized the interdependence of peace and trade” (23). JE – If you remember, EH Carr was very harsh towards Wilson in his The Twenty Year’s Crisis.

Tenets of breakdown:

1. currency collapses is Russia, Germany and Austria
2. final fall of the gold standard
3. liberal state transformed into totalitarian dictatorships

“But whatever the scenery and the temperature of the final episodes, the long-run factors which wrecked that civilization should be studied in the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, England” (32).

Economic liberalism misread the history of the Industrial Revolution because it insisted on judging social events from the economic viewpoint” (35).

Smith, Adam “Wealth of Nations” 1776.

“The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labor, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labor” (161).

On pinmaking and the division of labor: “But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades” (161).

“The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbors in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former” (163).

The advantage is due to three circumstances: a) improved dexterity; b) saving of time; and c) application of machinery invented by workmen, or by machine-makers and philosophers (164).

“It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labor, which occasions, in a well-grounded society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” (166).

“The division of labor arises from a propensity in human nature to exchange. This propensity is found in man alone” (168).

“It is encouraged by self-interest and leads to division of labor, thus giving rise to differences of talent more important than the natural differences, and rendering those differences useful” (169).

“Division of labor is limited by the extent of the power of exchanging. Various trades cannot be carried on except in towns” (171).

“The great commerce is that between town and country, which is obviously advantageous to both” (248).

“The cultivation of the country must be prior to the increase of the town, though the town may sometimes be distant from the country from which it derives substances” (249).

“This order of things is favored by the natural preference of man for agriculture” (249).

Ruggie, John G. “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain – Issues, Actors and Practices” 2004.

“My aim in this article is to provide a more comprehensive set of lenses, drawing attention to the beginnings of a fundamental reconstitution of the global public domain—away from one that equated the ‘public’ in international politics with states and the interstate realm to one in which the very system of states is becoming embedded in a broader, albeit still thin and institutionalized arena…” (500).

“Not surprisingly, interest in the political significance of TNCs stayed alive and more recently has enjoyed a minor renaissance in the international relations literature inspired by the so-called critical theory” (502).

“Thus, Wapner’s notion of a ‘world civic politics’ associated with civil society organizations and Cutler’s concept of ‘private governance’ associated with transnational corporations are two of the building blocks of what I call the new global public domain…” (504).

“Although the new global public domain is hardly unchallenged, its emergence, like globalization, to which it is closely linked, is part of a broadening and deepening sociality at the global level” (504).

“States constituted the international ‘public’ – as in public international law and public international unions, the name given to 19^th century international organizations” (505).

“The spatial map characteristic of the traditional international political world has undergone a major transformation over the past generation. Above all there has been a shift in the locus of issues on the global governance agenda along a set of axes depicting ‘external’, ‘internal’ and ‘universal’ dimensions of policy spaces” (507).

“A similar blurring of the two spheres has occurred as a result of the trade regime expanding horizontally to encompass entirely new dimensions that previously has not been associated with trade at all” (508).

“In short the spatial configuration of the global governance agenda has become far more open, fluid and tightly coupled across states than the baseline picture represented by figure 1” (509).

“[Non-state actors] include transnational corporations and financial institutions; civil society organizations; faith-based movements; private military contractors that in some respects resemble the mercenaries of yore; and such illicit entities as transnational terrorist and criminal networks’ (509-510).

“The rights of transnational corporations have expanded manifold over the past quarter century as a result of multilateral trade agreements, bilateral investment pacts, and domestic liberalization – often pushed by external actors, including states and the international financial institutions” (510).

“But the iconic case of civil society actions to redress imbalances in global rulemaking remains its role in defeating the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, strongly supported by TNCs and international business associations” (511).

“CSOs, in turn, have pushed for companies and industries to adopt verifiable measures to reduce the incidences of such behavior” (512).

“A third and very different rationale for targeting the transnational corporate sector has emerged in the past few years – the sheer fact that it has global reach and capacity, and that it is capable of making and implementing decisions at a pace that neither governments nor international agencies can match” (514).

“There is a certain moral and intellectual obtuseness to a position that considers people’s welfare to be an uninteresting concern for international relations theorizing, particularly at a time when the individual enjoys more extensive recognition in international politics and law than ever before” (519).

“Political leaders and international relations theorists alike ignore the emergence of the new global public domain at their peril. Without it, one cannot fully understand recent developments in human rights, environmental policy, global public health, changing social expectations regarding the role of corporations, and the normative context for considerations of the use of force – indeed, according to some scholars, even the fate of the Soviet Union and its empire” (521).

“But the resulting picture would show the progressive arrival on the global stage of a distinctive public domain – thinner, more partial, and more fragile than its domestic counterpart, to be sure, but existing and taking root apart from the sphere of interstate relations.

Rodrik, Dani. “Governance of Economic Globalization.” 2000.

“If it was the nineteenth century that unleashed capitalism in its full force, it was the twentieth century that tamed it and boosted its productivity by supplying the institutional underpinnings of market-based economics” (347).

“These institutional innovations greatly enhanced the efficiency and legitimacy of markets and in turn drew strength from the material advancement unleashed by market forces” (347).

“But globalization also undercuts the ability of nation-states to erect regulatory and redistributive institutions and does so at the same time that it increases the premium on solid national institutions” (348).

“The dilemma that we face as we enter the twenty-first century is that markets are striving to become global while the institutions needed to support them remain by and large national” (348).

“National borders seem to have a significantly depressing effect on commerce, even in the absence of formal tariff or nontariff barriers, linguistic or cultural differences, uncertainty about the exchange rate, and other economic obstacles” (349).

“The most obvious way we can attain such a world is by institutin federalism on a global scale. Global federalism would align jurisdictions with the market, and remove the “border” effects” (353).

“National governments would not necessarily disappear, but their powers would be severely circumscribed by supranational legislative, executive, and judicial authorities” (353).

“The price of maintaining national jurisdictional sovereignty while markets become international restricting politics to a narrow domain” (354).

“Hence for cooperation to be sustainable, the short-term benefits of defection must be small, the discount rate low, and the future benefits from cooperation high” (357).

“As long as nation-states remain at the core of the international system, considerations of sustainability and diversity require that the rule allow selective disengagement from multilateral disciplines” ( 361).

“Global federalism would not mean that the United Nations turns itself into a world government. What we would be likely to get is a combination of traditional forms of governance (an elected global legislative body)with regulatory institutions spanning multiple jurisdictions and accountable to perhaps multiple types of representative bodies’ (363).

What Should We Expect IR theory to do?

What Should We Expect?: Theorizing Towards a Normative IR Theory

Introduction

I might be what E.H. Carr would have called a “utopian”. Not because I think Wilsonian democracy should be spread through all the land, but because I do believe there should be normative content to international politics and international relations theory. For Carr, the utopians suffered from “one-sided intellectualism,” and ignored the role of power in international affairs (Carr 2001: 29). Since, the study of international politics has dealt with power in a number ways through realist, neorealist and neoliberal critiques. Moreover, most IR theory has dealt with the role of states in international politics, all the while wondering “what to do” about such and such state rather than “what should we know” about this state (Hoffman 1977: 240). This set-up the discipline as seemingly positivistic – describing what the world is like – and not normative, or suggesting what the world should look like. In this essay I argue that IR theory is lacking in theories and models that are normative, and that by theorizing more on the “ought” questions the discipline would be helped greatly. Until IR does this, we cannot expect the academy to influence in a positive way both practitioners and citizens.

Positivism, Science and International Relations Theory

Much of IR theory – and political science in general -- sought more scientific approaches to understanding politics and hoped to break with commonsensical and subjectivist understandings of political phenomena (Ashley 1986: 257). Carr started this tradition in IR with his Twenty Year’s Crisis and the first renderings of what is known today as realist theory. Utopianism was based on subjectivism and ethical standards that were bound to change, whereas realism grew out of Marx’s structural, determinist, and scientific influence (Carr 2001: 65). Hans Morgenthau reaffirmed Carr’s assessment of realism by arguing that politics was governed by undisputable “objective laws,” that were “supported by evidence and illuminated by reason” (Morgenthau 1993: 4). These objective laws forced realists to argue that states or systems always operated in this way or that. Carr thought that all states sought to maximize their power. Morgenthau’s contribution – interest defined as power – analyzed how all state decisions involve the possible affects to state power. Kenneth Waltz also proffered up a seeming objective law: that states acted in accord with their security interests in an anarchic world order (Waltz 1979).

Realists and neorealists are not the only ones who base their theorizing on scientific positivism and sought to explain what states would do in a given situation. Neoliberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane believe that states not only seek to protect their power and own interests, but do so through cooperation “after hegemony.” Because all states are rational-egoists and seek to promote their self-interest, cooperation works because states can simultaneously help one another and maintain their own interests (Keohane 1984: 50). Andrew Moravscik’s “liberal theory” explained how domestic and societal pressures influenced the policies of states within an international community, noting that state preferences matter (Moravscik 1997: 516-518). And while Moravscik’s liberal theory broke away from the tidal wave of IR theory that simply examined states apart from domestic politics, he nevertheless makes clear to distinguish himself from the often ridiculed “idealists” and “moralists” (Moravscik 1997: 514).

IR theory’s attempts to be positivistic and scientific might be tolerable if these same scholars did not engage in the same activities they ridiculed about the utopians. Carr was deemed the “Red professor,” by a columnist at the London Times for proposing an alliance between Russia, the United States and Great Britain following the war. (Cox 2001: lxxii). His own predisposition to critical theory and Marx influenced his notions of power and highlighted his belief that economics and politics were inextricably intertwined (Carr 2001: 109). Morgenthau, while hoping to study the objective laws of politics, avowed his normative complaints about the “mistaken attitudes” in American foreign policy (Morgenthau 1993: 7). And a host of IR theorists (Keohane and Waltz included) joined forces to form Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy, a nonpartisan foreign affairs group that spoke out against the Iraq war.[1] Although the text of their letter indicated concerns over security and costs – typical of the dominating camps of IR thought – their normative concern about what the Bush administration ought to do superseded their desire to be scientific and objective in this situation. Social scientists have every right to be political and normative as anyone else in society, but why do they refuse to pursue this objective in academic writings, settling for what is and rather than what ought to be?

Movements like postmodernism, historical sociology and social constructivism have fought somewhat to break away from the dominance of the positivists. Poststructuralists like Richard Ashley questioned the preeminence of the state in international relations and tried to show the problematic nature of issues like sovereignty within the modernist framework (Ashley 1986: 269). Historical institutionalists like Anthony Giddens beg IR theorists to understand the origins (or history) of the nation-state with respect to capitalism and industrialism and its connection to the West (Giddens 1987: 34). Lastly, the social constructivist movement identified most prominently with Alexander Wendt questioned the causation and materialism and asserted what he called the “constitutive relationships” in international politics (Wendt 2003: 25). While these movements have been good at questioning the assumptions of the dominant schools of thought, in many ways they have done little in replacing these theories with normative ones. As Wendt said about Social Theory of International Politics: “It is not a normative view of how the world ought to be, but a scientific view of how the world is” (Wendt 2003: 24).

Reason For Hope?

There might be some reason for hope that normative IR theory is making perhaps a comeback, albeit in a very different way than before. Those known as critical constructivists have suggested that scholarly work always has normative implications. Any good scholar that knows the intricacies of international politics, so argue critical constructivists, also have the knowledge to change or alter the system for the better (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998: 677). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have paid particular attention to transnational advocacy networks and how they affect international politics in terms of human rights, civil society and environmental issues. They admit that scholarship on such topics as human rights has been under-theorized and rarely discussed because IR has ignored issues of normative importance (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 5). Harkening back to Stanley Hoffman’s concerns about what “we should we know” rather than what are “we to do,” Keck and Sikking stress the importance of understanding the international community and the norms that govern it. By doing so, one can more easily accomplish whatever goals an advocacy network chooses to adopt.

Conclusion

Despite the influence of the critical constructivists and scholars like Keck and Sikking, IR theory still woefully lacks a grand normative theory. This is particularly troubling to students and practitioners who might look to the academy for a fresh perspective on politics. And citizens, who generally orient their lives around a number of normative issues, could be helped greatly by theories with normative content. Instead, what they get is a description of what states do and why states will always do this. As I have demonstrated, it is not that IR lacks scholars with a normative backbone. It is quite the contrary. On the other hand, very few scholarly works deal explicitly with ought questions, which I maintain are the most important to know about. While realism, neorealism, and neoliberalism all have their place in IR there is no reason to exclude debate among the disparaged “idealists,” “moralists,” or “utopians”. Scholars must take seriously these claims and not discount them as “political window dressing” that deserves no place in IR theory. That is what IR theory should do for us.

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[1] You can find this group at www.sensibleforeignpolicy.net

Short Review of Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Summary and Critique

Introduction

In the study of international relations, the concept of power has been given preeminence. E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz argued that power was center stage in any discussion of state interaction. The authors I discuss — Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, and John Ruggie — are no different. However, these authors situate their discussion of power within the rubric of neoliberal institutionalism. In particular, they explore the idea of cooperation “after hegemony,” whereas powerful states seek cooperation as a means to attain and restore power. Notwithstanding nuance, each author also argues that states and regimes follow rational-egoist logic, and are not guided by some moral compass. This paper fleshes out in more detail the institutional (or regime) framework, and demonstrates how this approach was an improvement over previous “ideal-types,” and Realist notions. A second concern of this paper, however, is to analyze the shortfalls of the rational-egoist logic Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie employ. Although Keohane and Krasner discussed the concept of empathetic interdependence and the problem of lags at length, I suggest that these issues might undermine the rational-egoist logic as a whole.

Cooperation and Regimes: Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie

Most of the arguments about neoliberal institutions are centered on Robert Keohane’s seminal work, After Hegemony. For Keohane, he wondered about a world of cooperation “after hegemony,” where there were no hegemonic superpowers, and the international environment consisted of many regimes and institutions (Keohane 1984: 49). He surmised that although cooperation was hard, and could easily lead to situations of discord,[1] regimes and institutions could benefit states by incorporating cooperative strategies. They also had their own conception of what cooperation and regimes were. By cooperation, they meant a process whereby states, “adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane 1984: 51). By regimes, they meant “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states” (Ruggie as cited in Keohane 1984: 57). At first glance, this might appear to be what E.H. Carr would call “utopian” thinking, but neoliberal institutionalists are not utopian in the slightest. Rather, they argue that states pursue such policies because it is usually in the best interest of all involved to do so.[2]

For Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie, they all are attracted to rational-egoist logic, or what some might call rational choice institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalists accept that actors, in this case states, seek to do what is in their best interest. But unlike overly atomistic conceptions of rational choice logic, rational choice institutionalists argue that actors’ choices are limited by a number of factors: partial information, bounded rationality, partial knowledge and institutional constraints being just four (Shepsle 1989: 138-139). In their discussion of rational-egoism, the authors made clear their distrust of these “atomistic” notions. As Keohane acknowledged, one cannot observe state behavior as “a set of discrete, isolated acts,” but that they must be understood in a larger “pattern of cooperation” (Keohane 1984: 56). And as Ruggie pointed out, this pattern of cooperation cannot be understood in some “generic sense” but in a sense where institutions are taken seriously (Ruggie 1992: 597).[3] Moreover, rational-egoism is not based on short-term calculations or temporary arrangements. Regimes are seen as enduring creatures, not based on one-shot ventures among states (Krasner 1982: 186-167). The rational-egoist logic they employ also lodges a critique of the behavioral malady that plagued political science in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas some international relations theorists wished to measure power based on quality of weapons, or wealth, these authors thought this was a behaviorist mistake (Keohane 1984: 20).[4] Put simply, observing individual action tells one nothing of the system at large.

Although the neoliberal institutional framework suggests that power is important, and that states do things in their self-interest, one should not necessarily confuse the Realist and neorealist camp with neoliberalism. For E.H. Carr, the process of cooperation was doomed to failure, and his pessimism about the League of Nations was prevalent in his, Twenty Years’ Crisis (Carr 1939: 52). In Kenneth Waltz’s, Theory of International Politics, Waltz argued that in an anarchic world order, bipolarity stabilizes, or balances power, and that cooperation was equally difficult (Waltz 1979: 171). In fact, multiple states can threaten stability. Waltz also makes the faulty distinction that wealth and power can be separated, a claim neoliberals think is bunk. But the main point of contention between neoliberals and realists is the concept of power with respect to an institutional set-up. “What distinguishes my argument from structural realism,” Keohane writes, “is my emphasis on the effects of international institutions and practices of state behavior.” Like political theorist Jeffrey Isaak suggested, Waltz might have made a “first face” of power mistake, observing what states did, and not necessarily how power existed within a systemic, international environment.[5] For Keohane and others, their point-of-departure was at the systemic level (Keohane 1984: 26).

A Critique of Rational-Egoism: Some Methodological Issues

Thus far, the paper has been kind to the neoliberal institutional model in both its methodology and substance. However, two issues in particular seem to question the logic of rational-egoism with regard to regimes and institutions. First, is Keohane’s example of empathetic interdependence in international politics. Second, is Krasner’s discussion of lags within regimes. By empathetic interdependence, Keohane calls attention to situations where states do things that seemingly contradict the notion of self-interest and rational-egoist thinking. For example, although some instances of governmental aid can account for self-interest, some aid and programs given to others defies self-interest (Keohane 1984: 123). With the example of lags, Krasner notes that often times power and interest might change, but regimes do not (Krasner 1982: 501). In this case, previous customs and rules prevail, because that’s the “way the did it in the past” (Krasner 1982: 502).

Empathy and the problem of lags would seem to spell trouble for the rational-egoist methodology, but Keohane and Krasner brush away these critiques. With regards to empathy, Keohane has asserted that reputation plays a role in state response. Although some rules would have no seeming validity, to violate them could result in severe reputational repercussions. Lastly, as Keohane is quick to point out, what appears to be empathy might actually be rational, self-interest (Keohane 1984: 132). Krasner, although troubled at how lags could destabilize regimes, believes that lags ultimately occur infrequently, and rarely occur at such duration to render regimes meaningless (Krasner 1982: 501). Of course, if regimes act empathetically too often, and lags occur too much, Keohane and Krasner have serious problems with their methodology. Take for instance the example provided by John Meyer and Brian Rowan.

While Meyer and Rowan are best known for their work in organizational theory, their theory about “institutionalized myths” might apply in the cases of empathy and lags. Meyer and Rowan argue that institutions or regimes have formal rules, customs and norms, but rarely are these rules what they appear to be. Instead, although an organization might have some sort of formal blueprint for what ought to happen, rarely does this blueprint match onto the inner-workings of the organization. This mismatch creates “gaps” in the reality of institutional goings-on. The ultimate lesson one can learn from Meyer and Rowan is this — the institution and what it does becomes mythological (Meyer and Rowan 1982: 60). For example, one perceives that hospitals or schools are good things without ever investigating what it is hospitals or schools really do (Meyer and Rowan 1982: 54). Moreover, one might support giving aid to these institutions based on these perceptions.

Meyer and Rowan present Keohane and Krasner with an interesting dilemma. If rational-egoists make decisions based on institutionalized myths, how rational are their decisions? Keohane, as he did throughout After Hegemony, might at some level of abstraction, be able to make a rational-egoist claim based on institutionalized myth. But I do not think it is that simple. For example, regimes giving international aid might appear to have self-interested goals at hand — advancing capitalism or protecting natural resources — but under closer investigation, it is not always clear why regimes might give aid, especially when giving aid could have disastrous results.[6] As Norman Angell explained some eighty years ago, attempts at global economic power fail more than work (Angell 1933: 74). Second, in a world of bounded rationality, the myths could become “shortcuts” on how one should act. For Krasner, institutional myths might create a different type of problem. Krasner argued that lags had the potential to hurt regimes and their durability for cooperation. But for Meyer and Rowan, myths actually reinforce regimes and institutions. The more we perceive certain actions to be good, like giving aid, and others to be bad, like not giving aid, institutions endure. These conflicts between rules and norms that Krasner was so worried about thus mean very little in the end.

The extent to which regimes act on myths would be hard to detect. For one, no regime would admit they acted so irrationally. But secondly, it would be hard to imagine programs of cooperation enduring without respect to shared norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and organizational plans at some point in the mutually beneficial relationship. While I am not naïve enough to think that morality is run amok in the affairs of regimes, events happen that defy rational-egoist logic. Institutionalized myths might fill these gaps.

Conclusion

The neoliberal institutional model gave IR theorists another lens through which to examine politics. While it agrees with some tenants of the realist and neorealist camp — that power is important and actors do things in their own interest — they raise a larger question about how, although infrequent, cooperation happens in the world. As well, these IR theorists argue that actor’s choices are also constrained by a larger international system. Through partial information, partial knowledge, bounded rationality, and other institutional constraints, the policy of cooperation is difficult, but possible. From their rational-egoist logic, however, flowed two concerns: the situation of empathetic interdependence and the problem of lags. I suggest that these two concerns might undermine the rational-egoist method that regimes employ to achieve cooperation. Taking a page from Meyer and Rowan, I argue that regimes might actually engage in a process of “institutionalized myths,” whereby they make decisions based on their perceptions of the international world. Rarely do these assumptions match on to the blueprint of reality. Nonetheless, neoliberal institutionalism gives students and scholars a more qualified analysis of age-old international relations problems. For this they should be complemented.

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[1] Discord comes about when actors do not “adjust their policies to…other’s objectives (Keohane 52).

[2] Keohane and Krasner are quick to point out that this is not Adam Smith’s laissez-faire logic at work, where actors pursue self-interest for the sake of the common good. As Keohane notes: “The argument here for the importance of international regimes does not depend on smuggling in assumptions about altruism and irrationality” (29).

[3] Ruggie was especially concerned with the rise of multilateralism after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

[4] Behaviorism, as Shepsle noted, used “precise observation, counting and measuring where possible,” to solve political questions (See Shepsle, 1989).

[5] By “first face” argument, I am referring to Robert Dahl’s conception of power put forth in (1961) Who Governs? Isaak sought to correct this “behaviorist” tendency by looking at the “structure” of power relationships.

[6] This is possibly the case in Rwanda, where the IMF and the world ignored the ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi in the 1990s.

Some Thoughts on Poststructuralism in IR Theory

Poststructuralism in IR: an Assessment and Critique

Introduction

Much of international relations theory is centered on debates of realism and liberalism and its many variants. These theories explained in a parsimonious way what appeared to be the recurring patterns of international politics; for example, power, security or cooperation. But some IR theorists thought these scholars were trapped in modernist and structuralist logic that “treat[ed] the given order as the natural order” (Ashley 1986: 259). Scholars that lodged these critiques were known by a number of titles: poststructuralists, postmodernists, or postpositivists. Although the poststructural movement did not replace the realist or liberal logic with a theory of its own, poststructuralists did hope to question many of the assumptions of both schools. In this paper, I will flesh out several of the poststructural concerns offered by Richard Ashley, James Der Derian and Daniel Campbell. Secondly, while the poststructural movement has some interesting insights into the discipline of IR, I argue that the movement does little more than just that. In particular Campbell’s conception of “us” and the “other” as a way to reaffirm domestic politics is particularly flawed — both methodologically and empirically. Lastly, I suggest that Andrew Moravcsik’s “liberal theory” better explains how domestic politics influences international relations.

A Summary of Poststructuralism

Poststructural logic arose as a response to the structural, or modernist, vein in various academic disciplines. The structural approach argued that various structures were paramount in the organization of society. By analyzing these structures one could develop a rather scientific approach to studying things – like politics, economics, sociology or psychology for instance – that generally appeared outside the scope of the scientific method. Coupled with modernism, a product of the Enlightenment and a belief in reasoned man over God, structuralists hoped to produce “objective, theoretical rendering[s], [that broke] radically with its predecessors’ allegedly commonsensical, subjectivist, atomistic, and empiricist understandings” (Ashley 1986: 257). This structuralism, so poststructuralists argue, has influenced in a detrimental way the critical debates in IR theory such as realism, neorealism, and liberalism. Poststructuralists hope to break out of this structural malady, and question its “statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments” (Ashley 1986: 258).

Poststructural thought, like structuralism, has its roots in various academic disciplines. Sociologists Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault are two men that informed the poststructural debate during its inception. Derrida developed the notion of logocentrism. By logocentrism, Derrida meant a “practical orientation and a procedure that at once presupposes, invokes, and effects a normalizing practical expectation” (Ashley 1989: 261). Put simply, these logocentric views were previously accepted arrangements and rarely were these arrangements questioned or viewed as problematic. Moreover, logocentrism focuses of “logos” that create some sort of insider/outsider, or us vs. them, paradigm. Ashley utilizes Derrida’s logocentric formula on a number of dimensions. First, Ashley is concerned with the language of IR discourse and how some “logos” are privileged over others. In critiquing Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War, Ashley suggests that Waltz privileges “rational man” or “irrational war” thus reaffirming the modern, structural obsession with an insider/outsider paradigm (Ashley 1989: 286). Secondly, Ashley is concerned with how concepts like the state, sovereignty, and war are rarely questioned as problematic in international politics (Ashley 1989: 302). If the state is the central unit of analysis in IR and yet it is rarely thoroughly examined, how accurate are the assumptions that realism and liberalism rest on?

Foucault’s discussion of “panopticism” also contributed to the growing literature in poststructural thought. Panopticism derives its origins from Jeremy Bentham’s discussion of the panopticon, “an annular structure with a tower in the center which contains — or may not contain — a guard to observe and through this observation indirectly, nonviolently control… [people’s] behavior” (Der Derian 1990: 304). Foucault was fascinated by this concept that he thought reaffirmed the differentiation of man as abnormal or normal, the civil or the uncivil. Der Derian asserted that panopticism occurred in international politics. While there was no “central watchtower,” there were great powers that normalized relations of law and conduct and railed against conduct or societies that disrupted these relations (Der Derian 1990: 304).[1]

This notion of “otherness” is central to Der Derian’s argument about the technological advances of international politics: simulation, surveillance and speed. He suggests that new technological advances reinforce ideas about “us” and “them,” and displace the “reality” that realists and liberals purport to know about (Der Derian 1990: 298). For example, computer military simulations create an alternative “reality” and “new space” where events of international politics happen (Der Derian 1990:301). The growth of surveillance techniques, Der Derian argues, shows the paranoia inherent in international politics of the “other” or of those “we” do not know (Der Derian 1990: 306). These technological advances also make time, rather than space, a factor international politics. Speed in international politics demonstrates that “space is no longer in geography — it’s in electronics” (Der Derian 1990:307). The electronic capabilities bring states closer to one another, and minimize the distance between territories.

Der Derian’s and Ashley’s discussion of “otherness” is critical to poststructural logic. But their conceptualization of “other” was utilized in large part by states as an international strategy. Campbell, on the other hand, thinks the us vs. them paradigm also works as a domestic strategy. States engage in international politics as a way to cultivate state identity and legitimize its role. As Campbell argues: “The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity of existence: it is its condition of possibility” (Campbell 1992: 13). Campbell pieces together a provocative narrative about the United States and their articulation of state identity. From cultural Puritanism, through battles with Native Americans, struggles with communism, and numerous foreign wars, the United States has continuously delineated the “insiders” and “outsiders” of the system and created a “well-established discursive economy of identity/difference” (Campbell 1992: 145). Although written before the September 11^th tragedy, Campbell argued that terrorism might be the new battle between “us” and “them” (Campbell 1992: 2).

The Limits of Poststructuralism

The most common criticism raised about the poststructuralist movement is: So what? The poststructural movement, while questioning many of the realist and liberal assumptions, does very little in the way of proposing a theory of their own. I think this critique is important but not the most salient. To reveal the cracks in IR theory is not necessarily a case of “armchair” quarterbacking on the part of the poststructuralists. These “cracks” in the logic reveal problems or lapses with the mainstream IR theories that IR scholars should take seriously. Der Derian does raise interesting insights about the “new” spaces in politics, and Ashley is right that notions of statehood and sovereignty might be problematic. Ultimately, however, poststructuralists do little in the way of providing solutions to the problems they raise. This does not mean creating some parsimonious theory like realism. What it does mean, however, is suggesting ways to break away from the problems they raise, or articulating in a more normative fashion how international politics ought to operate.

Campbell is an extreme version of what plagues the poststructural movement. In an almost polemical fashion, Campbell mocks every American attempt at national security as an instance of creating an insider/outsider paradigm. In doing so he provides virtually no theory for what should make up national security, and what exactly practitioners of international politics ought to do. Methodologically, Campbell assumes that citizens are seemingly “duped” into believing the scare tactics of foreign policy. In a top-down way, Campbell asserts that governments create dangerous threats, and the citizens believe them on almost all accounts. This “social construction” of danger is accomplished on a number of dimensions: loyalty oaths, the Pledge of Allegiance, or committees dedicated to “Americanism” (Campbell 1992: 144). This assertion of socially constructed danger obscures the fact that people are scared for very real reasons. Put simply: this is a dangerous world.[2]

The empirical evidence is also suspect. Although he correctly predicted terrorism as the new “threat,” he felt as though terrorism was once again something created by the state to reaffirm its identity. “…Terrorism is often cited as a major threat to national security,” Campbell wrote, “even though its occurrence within the United States in minimal” (Campbell 1992: 2). Given domestic and global events, the United States’ concern with terrorism seemed certainly legitimate, and not just a social construction. With respect to communism, Campbell similarly oversimplifies. While Campbell is right that the “Red Scare” and McCarthyism were scars on the American political tradition, citizens had every right to be concerned with communism. The Khrushchev Report (1956), which detailed the atrocities of the Stalin era, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's (1973) Gulag Archipelago, an exploration of Soviet labor camps, are just two examples that gave some a reason to be worried. Moreover, as David Horowitz has suggested, if communists were interested in overthrowing the state via nondemocratic means, the government should take action against them.[3]

Moravcsik, Domestic Politics, and IR theory

Although I disagree with most of Campbell’s assessment of international politics, I do agree that domestic politics is important in discussions of foreign policy. Take Moravscik’s “liberal” theory of international politics. Moravscik argues that realism and institutionalism has suffered theoretically because liberal theory “defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold” (Moravscik 1997: 516). These “conditions” are the impact of societal actors, representation of domestic interests by states, and how these states then operate in an international system (Moravscik 1997: 516-520). Unlike Campbell, Moravscik’s liberal theory is “bottom-up,” because “the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics” (Moravscik 1997: 517). The state thus becomes a representative body of these societal actors, and these actors use the state to achieve their goals.

This is an improvement on Campbell, who thinks that the state determines the course of events prior to foreign policy. By denying the agency of the actors, Campbell can conveniently argue that the state does whatever it wants with the implicit consent of the populace. Moravscik’s model, on the other hand, gives actors a voice. The state’s response to terrorism, thus, was informed in part by the public’s desire for security. A major criticism of the Bush administration following September 11^th was their desire for people to buy goods as a way to “help out,” a poor growing economy. It was the citizens, not the state, that wanted to contribute to combat a threat they knew was real.[4]

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to treat poststructural thought fairly, taking their arguments seriously, and trying to situate their concerns within the current debates in IR. Ashley recommends that we be more aware of “logocentric’ thought, and Der Derian argues that IR scholars should have some answer for the new “spaces” in international politics. Campbell suggests that IR should be aware of the identity/difference paradigm and the role of domestic politics in foreign policy. While the poststructural movement has some interesting things to add to the discipline, ultimately they provide no evidence on how to correct these seemingly glaring problems. Scholars like Campbell, moreover, are threatened by their own methodological and empirical problems. Drawing on the work of Moravscik, I argue that the liberal theory better describes the role of domestic society in IR. In time, poststructuralists might have more impact on the discipline. But until they address some of the questions raised in this essay – and those raised across the discipline -- poststructuralists for better or worse will continue to be a marginal segment in IR theory.

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[1] Der Derian argued that the “anti-Christ Turk, the colonial native, the Soviet threat, and the international terrorist” were just a couple of examples.

[2] Although not scholarly in origin, President George W. Bush has been heavily criticized for “scaring” people about the dangers and threats of the world.

[3] See Horowitz’s Radical Son (1997)

[4] Certainly much has been made about Bush remarks like the “Axis of Evil,” and “You’re with us or against us,” which would seem to jibe with Campbell’s argument of identity/difference. But these remarks followed the public’s outcry against terrorism. Once terrorism does not resonate in the domestic realm, actors will then put pressures on the state to change its policies.