Notes on International Political Economy

Gilpin, Robert “Global Political Economy.” 2001

“Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has been the most outstanding characteristic of international economic affairs and, to a considerable extent, of political affairs as well” (3).

“This is still a world where national policies and domestic economies are the principal determinants of economic affairs” (3).

“…In the 1980s, the overseas expansion of multinational firms integrated national economies more and more completely” (4).

“…This book takes a consciously realist or state-centric approach to analysis of the international economy. Differing from many contemporary writing on the global economy, I believe that the nation-state remains the dominant actor in both domestic and international economic affairs” (4).

Reasons for expansion of global trade:

a) decline of trade barriers after trade negotiations

b) deregulation and privatization opened up national economies

c) significance of increased investment (mutual funds up)

d) increasing importance of MNCs

Some argue: “The collapse of the Soviet command economy, the failure of the Third World’s import-substitution strategy, and the outstanding success of the American economy in the 1990s have encouraged acceptance of unrestricted markets as the solution to the economic ills of modern society” (8).

Critics argue: “The high costs of economic globalization including growing income inequality both among and within nations, high chronic levels of unemployment in western Europe and elsewhere, and most of all environmental degradation…” (9).

Gilpin argues: “The idea that globalization is responsible for most of the world’s economic, political, and other problems is either patently false or greatly exaggerated” (9).

“Regionalization is not an alternative to the nation-state, as some believe, but rather embodies the efforts of individual states to collectively promote their vital national interests and ambitions” (11).

“Historical experience indicates that the purpose of economic activities is ultimately determined not only by markets and the prescriptions of technical economics, but also by the norms, values and interests of the social and political systems in which economic activities are embedded” (12).

“My own normative commitment is to economic liberalism; that is, to free trade and minimal barriers to the flow of goods, services and capital across national boundaries, although, under certain restricted circumstances, nationalist policies such as trade protection and industrial policy may be justified’ (14).

“The point, however…is that realism and nationalism are not identical. Nationalists may be realists, but realists are not necessarily nationalists” (15).

Global political economy: “the interaction of the market and such powerful actors as states, multinational firms and international organizations” (17).

“It is certainly true that economics and technological forces are profoundly reshaping international affairs and influencing the behavior of states. However, in a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power to implement policies to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national interests and the interests of their citizenry” (21).

Polanyi, Karl. “The Great Transformation.” 1944.

“Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness” (3).

“The Nineteenth century produced a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of Western civilization, namely a hundred years peace – from 1814-1914” (5).

“The mere growth of wealth and population, or their decrease, is bound to set political forces in motion; and the external balance will invariably reflect the internal. Yet even an organized balance of power system can insure peace without the permanent threat of war only if it is able to act upon these internal factors directly and prevent imbalance in statu nascendi” (9).

“Yet the secret of the successful maintenance of general peace lay undoubtedly in the position, organization and techniques of international finance” (10).

The Rothschilds (wealthy capitalists): “They were anything but pacifists; they had made their fortune in the financing of wars; they were impervious to moral consideration; they had no objection to any number of minor, short or localized wars. But their businesses would be impaired if a general war between the great Powers should interfere with the monetary foundations of the system” (11).

“Haute finance, an institution sui generis, peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century functioned as the main link between the political and the economic organization of the world” (10).

Haute finance: no boundaries, not at all territorial

“Yet to the degree to which …it was actually independent of any single government, it was bale to serve a new interest , that had no specific organ of its own, for the service of which no other institution happened to be available, and which was nevertheless of vital importance to the community, namely peace’ (12).

“The chief danger, however, which stalked the capitalists of Europe was not technological or financial failure, but war – not a war between small countries (which could be easily isolated) nor war upon a small country by a Great Power (a frequent and often convenient occurrence), but a general war between the Great Powers themselves” (15).

“Trade was now dependent upon an international monetary system which could not function in general war. It demanded peace…” (16).

“The breakdown of the international gold standard was the invisible link between the disintegration of world economy which started at the turn of the century and the transformation of a whole civilization in the thirties” (21).

“The dissolution of the system of world economy which had been in progress since 1900 was responsible for the political tension that exploded in 1914; the outcome of the war and the treaties had eased the tension superficially by eliminating German competition while aggravating the causes of tension and thereby vastly increasing the political and economic impediments to peace” (22).

“The only viable solution of the burning problem of peace – balance of power – was completely out of reach” (22). All losers were disarmed, by the way.

“First among the statesmen of the time, Woodrow Wilson appears to have realized the interdependence of peace and trade” (23). JE – If you remember, EH Carr was very harsh towards Wilson in his The Twenty Year’s Crisis.

Tenets of breakdown:

1. currency collapses is Russia, Germany and Austria
2. final fall of the gold standard
3. liberal state transformed into totalitarian dictatorships

“But whatever the scenery and the temperature of the final episodes, the long-run factors which wrecked that civilization should be studied in the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, England” (32).

Economic liberalism misread the history of the Industrial Revolution because it insisted on judging social events from the economic viewpoint” (35).

Smith, Adam “Wealth of Nations” 1776.

“The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labor, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labor” (161).

On pinmaking and the division of labor: “But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades” (161).

“The most opulent nations, indeed, generally excel all their neighbors in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former” (163).

The advantage is due to three circumstances: a) improved dexterity; b) saving of time; and c) application of machinery invented by workmen, or by machine-makers and philosophers (164).

“It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labor, which occasions, in a well-grounded society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” (166).

“The division of labor arises from a propensity in human nature to exchange. This propensity is found in man alone” (168).

“It is encouraged by self-interest and leads to division of labor, thus giving rise to differences of talent more important than the natural differences, and rendering those differences useful” (169).

“Division of labor is limited by the extent of the power of exchanging. Various trades cannot be carried on except in towns” (171).

“The great commerce is that between town and country, which is obviously advantageous to both” (248).

“The cultivation of the country must be prior to the increase of the town, though the town may sometimes be distant from the country from which it derives substances” (249).

“This order of things is favored by the natural preference of man for agriculture” (249).

Ruggie, John G. “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain – Issues, Actors and Practices” 2004.

“My aim in this article is to provide a more comprehensive set of lenses, drawing attention to the beginnings of a fundamental reconstitution of the global public domain—away from one that equated the ‘public’ in international politics with states and the interstate realm to one in which the very system of states is becoming embedded in a broader, albeit still thin and institutionalized arena…” (500).

“Not surprisingly, interest in the political significance of TNCs stayed alive and more recently has enjoyed a minor renaissance in the international relations literature inspired by the so-called critical theory” (502).

“Thus, Wapner’s notion of a ‘world civic politics’ associated with civil society organizations and Cutler’s concept of ‘private governance’ associated with transnational corporations are two of the building blocks of what I call the new global public domain…” (504).

“Although the new global public domain is hardly unchallenged, its emergence, like globalization, to which it is closely linked, is part of a broadening and deepening sociality at the global level” (504).

“States constituted the international ‘public’ – as in public international law and public international unions, the name given to 19^th century international organizations” (505).

“The spatial map characteristic of the traditional international political world has undergone a major transformation over the past generation. Above all there has been a shift in the locus of issues on the global governance agenda along a set of axes depicting ‘external’, ‘internal’ and ‘universal’ dimensions of policy spaces” (507).

“A similar blurring of the two spheres has occurred as a result of the trade regime expanding horizontally to encompass entirely new dimensions that previously has not been associated with trade at all” (508).

“In short the spatial configuration of the global governance agenda has become far more open, fluid and tightly coupled across states than the baseline picture represented by figure 1” (509).

“[Non-state actors] include transnational corporations and financial institutions; civil society organizations; faith-based movements; private military contractors that in some respects resemble the mercenaries of yore; and such illicit entities as transnational terrorist and criminal networks’ (509-510).

“The rights of transnational corporations have expanded manifold over the past quarter century as a result of multilateral trade agreements, bilateral investment pacts, and domestic liberalization – often pushed by external actors, including states and the international financial institutions” (510).

“But the iconic case of civil society actions to redress imbalances in global rulemaking remains its role in defeating the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, strongly supported by TNCs and international business associations” (511).

“CSOs, in turn, have pushed for companies and industries to adopt verifiable measures to reduce the incidences of such behavior” (512).

“A third and very different rationale for targeting the transnational corporate sector has emerged in the past few years – the sheer fact that it has global reach and capacity, and that it is capable of making and implementing decisions at a pace that neither governments nor international agencies can match” (514).

“There is a certain moral and intellectual obtuseness to a position that considers people’s welfare to be an uninteresting concern for international relations theorizing, particularly at a time when the individual enjoys more extensive recognition in international politics and law than ever before” (519).

“Political leaders and international relations theorists alike ignore the emergence of the new global public domain at their peril. Without it, one cannot fully understand recent developments in human rights, environmental policy, global public health, changing social expectations regarding the role of corporations, and the normative context for considerations of the use of force – indeed, according to some scholars, even the fate of the Soviet Union and its empire” (521).

“But the resulting picture would show the progressive arrival on the global stage of a distinctive public domain – thinner, more partial, and more fragile than its domestic counterpart, to be sure, but existing and taking root apart from the sphere of interstate relations.

Rodrik, Dani. “Governance of Economic Globalization.” 2000.

“If it was the nineteenth century that unleashed capitalism in its full force, it was the twentieth century that tamed it and boosted its productivity by supplying the institutional underpinnings of market-based economics” (347).

“These institutional innovations greatly enhanced the efficiency and legitimacy of markets and in turn drew strength from the material advancement unleashed by market forces” (347).

“But globalization also undercuts the ability of nation-states to erect regulatory and redistributive institutions and does so at the same time that it increases the premium on solid national institutions” (348).

“The dilemma that we face as we enter the twenty-first century is that markets are striving to become global while the institutions needed to support them remain by and large national” (348).

“National borders seem to have a significantly depressing effect on commerce, even in the absence of formal tariff or nontariff barriers, linguistic or cultural differences, uncertainty about the exchange rate, and other economic obstacles” (349).

“The most obvious way we can attain such a world is by institutin federalism on a global scale. Global federalism would align jurisdictions with the market, and remove the “border” effects” (353).

“National governments would not necessarily disappear, but their powers would be severely circumscribed by supranational legislative, executive, and judicial authorities” (353).

“The price of maintaining national jurisdictional sovereignty while markets become international restricting politics to a narrow domain” (354).

“Hence for cooperation to be sustainable, the short-term benefits of defection must be small, the discount rate low, and the future benefits from cooperation high” (357).

“As long as nation-states remain at the core of the international system, considerations of sustainability and diversity require that the rule allow selective disengagement from multilateral disciplines” ( 361).

“Global federalism would not mean that the United Nations turns itself into a world government. What we would be likely to get is a combination of traditional forms of governance (an elected global legislative body)with regulatory institutions spanning multiple jurisdictions and accountable to perhaps multiple types of representative bodies’ (363).

What Should We Expect IR theory to do?

What Should We Expect?: Theorizing Towards a Normative IR Theory

Introduction

I might be what E.H. Carr would have called a “utopian”. Not because I think Wilsonian democracy should be spread through all the land, but because I do believe there should be normative content to international politics and international relations theory. For Carr, the utopians suffered from “one-sided intellectualism,” and ignored the role of power in international affairs (Carr 2001: 29). Since, the study of international politics has dealt with power in a number ways through realist, neorealist and neoliberal critiques. Moreover, most IR theory has dealt with the role of states in international politics, all the while wondering “what to do” about such and such state rather than “what should we know” about this state (Hoffman 1977: 240). This set-up the discipline as seemingly positivistic – describing what the world is like – and not normative, or suggesting what the world should look like. In this essay I argue that IR theory is lacking in theories and models that are normative, and that by theorizing more on the “ought” questions the discipline would be helped greatly. Until IR does this, we cannot expect the academy to influence in a positive way both practitioners and citizens.

Positivism, Science and International Relations Theory

Much of IR theory – and political science in general -- sought more scientific approaches to understanding politics and hoped to break with commonsensical and subjectivist understandings of political phenomena (Ashley 1986: 257). Carr started this tradition in IR with his Twenty Year’s Crisis and the first renderings of what is known today as realist theory. Utopianism was based on subjectivism and ethical standards that were bound to change, whereas realism grew out of Marx’s structural, determinist, and scientific influence (Carr 2001: 65). Hans Morgenthau reaffirmed Carr’s assessment of realism by arguing that politics was governed by undisputable “objective laws,” that were “supported by evidence and illuminated by reason” (Morgenthau 1993: 4). These objective laws forced realists to argue that states or systems always operated in this way or that. Carr thought that all states sought to maximize their power. Morgenthau’s contribution – interest defined as power – analyzed how all state decisions involve the possible affects to state power. Kenneth Waltz also proffered up a seeming objective law: that states acted in accord with their security interests in an anarchic world order (Waltz 1979).

Realists and neorealists are not the only ones who base their theorizing on scientific positivism and sought to explain what states would do in a given situation. Neoliberal institutionalists like Robert Keohane believe that states not only seek to protect their power and own interests, but do so through cooperation “after hegemony.” Because all states are rational-egoists and seek to promote their self-interest, cooperation works because states can simultaneously help one another and maintain their own interests (Keohane 1984: 50). Andrew Moravscik’s “liberal theory” explained how domestic and societal pressures influenced the policies of states within an international community, noting that state preferences matter (Moravscik 1997: 516-518). And while Moravscik’s liberal theory broke away from the tidal wave of IR theory that simply examined states apart from domestic politics, he nevertheless makes clear to distinguish himself from the often ridiculed “idealists” and “moralists” (Moravscik 1997: 514).

IR theory’s attempts to be positivistic and scientific might be tolerable if these same scholars did not engage in the same activities they ridiculed about the utopians. Carr was deemed the “Red professor,” by a columnist at the London Times for proposing an alliance between Russia, the United States and Great Britain following the war. (Cox 2001: lxxii). His own predisposition to critical theory and Marx influenced his notions of power and highlighted his belief that economics and politics were inextricably intertwined (Carr 2001: 109). Morgenthau, while hoping to study the objective laws of politics, avowed his normative complaints about the “mistaken attitudes” in American foreign policy (Morgenthau 1993: 7). And a host of IR theorists (Keohane and Waltz included) joined forces to form Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy, a nonpartisan foreign affairs group that spoke out against the Iraq war.[1] Although the text of their letter indicated concerns over security and costs – typical of the dominating camps of IR thought – their normative concern about what the Bush administration ought to do superseded their desire to be scientific and objective in this situation. Social scientists have every right to be political and normative as anyone else in society, but why do they refuse to pursue this objective in academic writings, settling for what is and rather than what ought to be?

Movements like postmodernism, historical sociology and social constructivism have fought somewhat to break away from the dominance of the positivists. Poststructuralists like Richard Ashley questioned the preeminence of the state in international relations and tried to show the problematic nature of issues like sovereignty within the modernist framework (Ashley 1986: 269). Historical institutionalists like Anthony Giddens beg IR theorists to understand the origins (or history) of the nation-state with respect to capitalism and industrialism and its connection to the West (Giddens 1987: 34). Lastly, the social constructivist movement identified most prominently with Alexander Wendt questioned the causation and materialism and asserted what he called the “constitutive relationships” in international politics (Wendt 2003: 25). While these movements have been good at questioning the assumptions of the dominant schools of thought, in many ways they have done little in replacing these theories with normative ones. As Wendt said about Social Theory of International Politics: “It is not a normative view of how the world ought to be, but a scientific view of how the world is” (Wendt 2003: 24).

Reason For Hope?

There might be some reason for hope that normative IR theory is making perhaps a comeback, albeit in a very different way than before. Those known as critical constructivists have suggested that scholarly work always has normative implications. Any good scholar that knows the intricacies of international politics, so argue critical constructivists, also have the knowledge to change or alter the system for the better (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998: 677). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have paid particular attention to transnational advocacy networks and how they affect international politics in terms of human rights, civil society and environmental issues. They admit that scholarship on such topics as human rights has been under-theorized and rarely discussed because IR has ignored issues of normative importance (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 5). Harkening back to Stanley Hoffman’s concerns about what “we should we know” rather than what are “we to do,” Keck and Sikking stress the importance of understanding the international community and the norms that govern it. By doing so, one can more easily accomplish whatever goals an advocacy network chooses to adopt.

Conclusion

Despite the influence of the critical constructivists and scholars like Keck and Sikking, IR theory still woefully lacks a grand normative theory. This is particularly troubling to students and practitioners who might look to the academy for a fresh perspective on politics. And citizens, who generally orient their lives around a number of normative issues, could be helped greatly by theories with normative content. Instead, what they get is a description of what states do and why states will always do this. As I have demonstrated, it is not that IR lacks scholars with a normative backbone. It is quite the contrary. On the other hand, very few scholarly works deal explicitly with ought questions, which I maintain are the most important to know about. While realism, neorealism, and neoliberalism all have their place in IR there is no reason to exclude debate among the disparaged “idealists,” “moralists,” or “utopians”. Scholars must take seriously these claims and not discount them as “political window dressing” that deserves no place in IR theory. That is what IR theory should do for us.

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[1] You can find this group at www.sensibleforeignpolicy.net

Short Review of Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Summary and Critique

Introduction

In the study of international relations, the concept of power has been given preeminence. E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz argued that power was center stage in any discussion of state interaction. The authors I discuss — Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, and John Ruggie — are no different. However, these authors situate their discussion of power within the rubric of neoliberal institutionalism. In particular, they explore the idea of cooperation “after hegemony,” whereas powerful states seek cooperation as a means to attain and restore power. Notwithstanding nuance, each author also argues that states and regimes follow rational-egoist logic, and are not guided by some moral compass. This paper fleshes out in more detail the institutional (or regime) framework, and demonstrates how this approach was an improvement over previous “ideal-types,” and Realist notions. A second concern of this paper, however, is to analyze the shortfalls of the rational-egoist logic Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie employ. Although Keohane and Krasner discussed the concept of empathetic interdependence and the problem of lags at length, I suggest that these issues might undermine the rational-egoist logic as a whole.

Cooperation and Regimes: Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie

Most of the arguments about neoliberal institutions are centered on Robert Keohane’s seminal work, After Hegemony. For Keohane, he wondered about a world of cooperation “after hegemony,” where there were no hegemonic superpowers, and the international environment consisted of many regimes and institutions (Keohane 1984: 49). He surmised that although cooperation was hard, and could easily lead to situations of discord,[1] regimes and institutions could benefit states by incorporating cooperative strategies. They also had their own conception of what cooperation and regimes were. By cooperation, they meant a process whereby states, “adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane 1984: 51). By regimes, they meant “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states” (Ruggie as cited in Keohane 1984: 57). At first glance, this might appear to be what E.H. Carr would call “utopian” thinking, but neoliberal institutionalists are not utopian in the slightest. Rather, they argue that states pursue such policies because it is usually in the best interest of all involved to do so.[2]

For Keohane, Krasner and Ruggie, they all are attracted to rational-egoist logic, or what some might call rational choice institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalists accept that actors, in this case states, seek to do what is in their best interest. But unlike overly atomistic conceptions of rational choice logic, rational choice institutionalists argue that actors’ choices are limited by a number of factors: partial information, bounded rationality, partial knowledge and institutional constraints being just four (Shepsle 1989: 138-139). In their discussion of rational-egoism, the authors made clear their distrust of these “atomistic” notions. As Keohane acknowledged, one cannot observe state behavior as “a set of discrete, isolated acts,” but that they must be understood in a larger “pattern of cooperation” (Keohane 1984: 56). And as Ruggie pointed out, this pattern of cooperation cannot be understood in some “generic sense” but in a sense where institutions are taken seriously (Ruggie 1992: 597).[3] Moreover, rational-egoism is not based on short-term calculations or temporary arrangements. Regimes are seen as enduring creatures, not based on one-shot ventures among states (Krasner 1982: 186-167). The rational-egoist logic they employ also lodges a critique of the behavioral malady that plagued political science in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas some international relations theorists wished to measure power based on quality of weapons, or wealth, these authors thought this was a behaviorist mistake (Keohane 1984: 20).[4] Put simply, observing individual action tells one nothing of the system at large.

Although the neoliberal institutional framework suggests that power is important, and that states do things in their self-interest, one should not necessarily confuse the Realist and neorealist camp with neoliberalism. For E.H. Carr, the process of cooperation was doomed to failure, and his pessimism about the League of Nations was prevalent in his, Twenty Years’ Crisis (Carr 1939: 52). In Kenneth Waltz’s, Theory of International Politics, Waltz argued that in an anarchic world order, bipolarity stabilizes, or balances power, and that cooperation was equally difficult (Waltz 1979: 171). In fact, multiple states can threaten stability. Waltz also makes the faulty distinction that wealth and power can be separated, a claim neoliberals think is bunk. But the main point of contention between neoliberals and realists is the concept of power with respect to an institutional set-up. “What distinguishes my argument from structural realism,” Keohane writes, “is my emphasis on the effects of international institutions and practices of state behavior.” Like political theorist Jeffrey Isaak suggested, Waltz might have made a “first face” of power mistake, observing what states did, and not necessarily how power existed within a systemic, international environment.[5] For Keohane and others, their point-of-departure was at the systemic level (Keohane 1984: 26).

A Critique of Rational-Egoism: Some Methodological Issues

Thus far, the paper has been kind to the neoliberal institutional model in both its methodology and substance. However, two issues in particular seem to question the logic of rational-egoism with regard to regimes and institutions. First, is Keohane’s example of empathetic interdependence in international politics. Second, is Krasner’s discussion of lags within regimes. By empathetic interdependence, Keohane calls attention to situations where states do things that seemingly contradict the notion of self-interest and rational-egoist thinking. For example, although some instances of governmental aid can account for self-interest, some aid and programs given to others defies self-interest (Keohane 1984: 123). With the example of lags, Krasner notes that often times power and interest might change, but regimes do not (Krasner 1982: 501). In this case, previous customs and rules prevail, because that’s the “way the did it in the past” (Krasner 1982: 502).

Empathy and the problem of lags would seem to spell trouble for the rational-egoist methodology, but Keohane and Krasner brush away these critiques. With regards to empathy, Keohane has asserted that reputation plays a role in state response. Although some rules would have no seeming validity, to violate them could result in severe reputational repercussions. Lastly, as Keohane is quick to point out, what appears to be empathy might actually be rational, self-interest (Keohane 1984: 132). Krasner, although troubled at how lags could destabilize regimes, believes that lags ultimately occur infrequently, and rarely occur at such duration to render regimes meaningless (Krasner 1982: 501). Of course, if regimes act empathetically too often, and lags occur too much, Keohane and Krasner have serious problems with their methodology. Take for instance the example provided by John Meyer and Brian Rowan.

While Meyer and Rowan are best known for their work in organizational theory, their theory about “institutionalized myths” might apply in the cases of empathy and lags. Meyer and Rowan argue that institutions or regimes have formal rules, customs and norms, but rarely are these rules what they appear to be. Instead, although an organization might have some sort of formal blueprint for what ought to happen, rarely does this blueprint match onto the inner-workings of the organization. This mismatch creates “gaps” in the reality of institutional goings-on. The ultimate lesson one can learn from Meyer and Rowan is this — the institution and what it does becomes mythological (Meyer and Rowan 1982: 60). For example, one perceives that hospitals or schools are good things without ever investigating what it is hospitals or schools really do (Meyer and Rowan 1982: 54). Moreover, one might support giving aid to these institutions based on these perceptions.

Meyer and Rowan present Keohane and Krasner with an interesting dilemma. If rational-egoists make decisions based on institutionalized myths, how rational are their decisions? Keohane, as he did throughout After Hegemony, might at some level of abstraction, be able to make a rational-egoist claim based on institutionalized myth. But I do not think it is that simple. For example, regimes giving international aid might appear to have self-interested goals at hand — advancing capitalism or protecting natural resources — but under closer investigation, it is not always clear why regimes might give aid, especially when giving aid could have disastrous results.[6] As Norman Angell explained some eighty years ago, attempts at global economic power fail more than work (Angell 1933: 74). Second, in a world of bounded rationality, the myths could become “shortcuts” on how one should act. For Krasner, institutional myths might create a different type of problem. Krasner argued that lags had the potential to hurt regimes and their durability for cooperation. But for Meyer and Rowan, myths actually reinforce regimes and institutions. The more we perceive certain actions to be good, like giving aid, and others to be bad, like not giving aid, institutions endure. These conflicts between rules and norms that Krasner was so worried about thus mean very little in the end.

The extent to which regimes act on myths would be hard to detect. For one, no regime would admit they acted so irrationally. But secondly, it would be hard to imagine programs of cooperation enduring without respect to shared norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and organizational plans at some point in the mutually beneficial relationship. While I am not naïve enough to think that morality is run amok in the affairs of regimes, events happen that defy rational-egoist logic. Institutionalized myths might fill these gaps.

Conclusion

The neoliberal institutional model gave IR theorists another lens through which to examine politics. While it agrees with some tenants of the realist and neorealist camp — that power is important and actors do things in their own interest — they raise a larger question about how, although infrequent, cooperation happens in the world. As well, these IR theorists argue that actor’s choices are also constrained by a larger international system. Through partial information, partial knowledge, bounded rationality, and other institutional constraints, the policy of cooperation is difficult, but possible. From their rational-egoist logic, however, flowed two concerns: the situation of empathetic interdependence and the problem of lags. I suggest that these two concerns might undermine the rational-egoist method that regimes employ to achieve cooperation. Taking a page from Meyer and Rowan, I argue that regimes might actually engage in a process of “institutionalized myths,” whereby they make decisions based on their perceptions of the international world. Rarely do these assumptions match on to the blueprint of reality. Nonetheless, neoliberal institutionalism gives students and scholars a more qualified analysis of age-old international relations problems. For this they should be complemented.

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[1] Discord comes about when actors do not “adjust their policies to…other’s objectives (Keohane 52).

[2] Keohane and Krasner are quick to point out that this is not Adam Smith’s laissez-faire logic at work, where actors pursue self-interest for the sake of the common good. As Keohane notes: “The argument here for the importance of international regimes does not depend on smuggling in assumptions about altruism and irrationality” (29).

[3] Ruggie was especially concerned with the rise of multilateralism after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

[4] Behaviorism, as Shepsle noted, used “precise observation, counting and measuring where possible,” to solve political questions (See Shepsle, 1989).

[5] By “first face” argument, I am referring to Robert Dahl’s conception of power put forth in (1961) Who Governs? Isaak sought to correct this “behaviorist” tendency by looking at the “structure” of power relationships.

[6] This is possibly the case in Rwanda, where the IMF and the world ignored the ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi in the 1990s.

Some Thoughts on Poststructuralism in IR Theory

Poststructuralism in IR: an Assessment and Critique

Introduction

Much of international relations theory is centered on debates of realism and liberalism and its many variants. These theories explained in a parsimonious way what appeared to be the recurring patterns of international politics; for example, power, security or cooperation. But some IR theorists thought these scholars were trapped in modernist and structuralist logic that “treat[ed] the given order as the natural order” (Ashley 1986: 259). Scholars that lodged these critiques were known by a number of titles: poststructuralists, postmodernists, or postpositivists. Although the poststructural movement did not replace the realist or liberal logic with a theory of its own, poststructuralists did hope to question many of the assumptions of both schools. In this paper, I will flesh out several of the poststructural concerns offered by Richard Ashley, James Der Derian and Daniel Campbell. Secondly, while the poststructural movement has some interesting insights into the discipline of IR, I argue that the movement does little more than just that. In particular Campbell’s conception of “us” and the “other” as a way to reaffirm domestic politics is particularly flawed — both methodologically and empirically. Lastly, I suggest that Andrew Moravcsik’s “liberal theory” better explains how domestic politics influences international relations.

A Summary of Poststructuralism

Poststructural logic arose as a response to the structural, or modernist, vein in various academic disciplines. The structural approach argued that various structures were paramount in the organization of society. By analyzing these structures one could develop a rather scientific approach to studying things – like politics, economics, sociology or psychology for instance – that generally appeared outside the scope of the scientific method. Coupled with modernism, a product of the Enlightenment and a belief in reasoned man over God, structuralists hoped to produce “objective, theoretical rendering[s], [that broke] radically with its predecessors’ allegedly commonsensical, subjectivist, atomistic, and empiricist understandings” (Ashley 1986: 257). This structuralism, so poststructuralists argue, has influenced in a detrimental way the critical debates in IR theory such as realism, neorealism, and liberalism. Poststructuralists hope to break out of this structural malady, and question its “statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments” (Ashley 1986: 258).

Poststructural thought, like structuralism, has its roots in various academic disciplines. Sociologists Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault are two men that informed the poststructural debate during its inception. Derrida developed the notion of logocentrism. By logocentrism, Derrida meant a “practical orientation and a procedure that at once presupposes, invokes, and effects a normalizing practical expectation” (Ashley 1989: 261). Put simply, these logocentric views were previously accepted arrangements and rarely were these arrangements questioned or viewed as problematic. Moreover, logocentrism focuses of “logos” that create some sort of insider/outsider, or us vs. them, paradigm. Ashley utilizes Derrida’s logocentric formula on a number of dimensions. First, Ashley is concerned with the language of IR discourse and how some “logos” are privileged over others. In critiquing Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War, Ashley suggests that Waltz privileges “rational man” or “irrational war” thus reaffirming the modern, structural obsession with an insider/outsider paradigm (Ashley 1989: 286). Secondly, Ashley is concerned with how concepts like the state, sovereignty, and war are rarely questioned as problematic in international politics (Ashley 1989: 302). If the state is the central unit of analysis in IR and yet it is rarely thoroughly examined, how accurate are the assumptions that realism and liberalism rest on?

Foucault’s discussion of “panopticism” also contributed to the growing literature in poststructural thought. Panopticism derives its origins from Jeremy Bentham’s discussion of the panopticon, “an annular structure with a tower in the center which contains — or may not contain — a guard to observe and through this observation indirectly, nonviolently control… [people’s] behavior” (Der Derian 1990: 304). Foucault was fascinated by this concept that he thought reaffirmed the differentiation of man as abnormal or normal, the civil or the uncivil. Der Derian asserted that panopticism occurred in international politics. While there was no “central watchtower,” there were great powers that normalized relations of law and conduct and railed against conduct or societies that disrupted these relations (Der Derian 1990: 304).[1]

This notion of “otherness” is central to Der Derian’s argument about the technological advances of international politics: simulation, surveillance and speed. He suggests that new technological advances reinforce ideas about “us” and “them,” and displace the “reality” that realists and liberals purport to know about (Der Derian 1990: 298). For example, computer military simulations create an alternative “reality” and “new space” where events of international politics happen (Der Derian 1990:301). The growth of surveillance techniques, Der Derian argues, shows the paranoia inherent in international politics of the “other” or of those “we” do not know (Der Derian 1990: 306). These technological advances also make time, rather than space, a factor international politics. Speed in international politics demonstrates that “space is no longer in geography — it’s in electronics” (Der Derian 1990:307). The electronic capabilities bring states closer to one another, and minimize the distance between territories.

Der Derian’s and Ashley’s discussion of “otherness” is critical to poststructural logic. But their conceptualization of “other” was utilized in large part by states as an international strategy. Campbell, on the other hand, thinks the us vs. them paradigm also works as a domestic strategy. States engage in international politics as a way to cultivate state identity and legitimize its role. As Campbell argues: “The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity of existence: it is its condition of possibility” (Campbell 1992: 13). Campbell pieces together a provocative narrative about the United States and their articulation of state identity. From cultural Puritanism, through battles with Native Americans, struggles with communism, and numerous foreign wars, the United States has continuously delineated the “insiders” and “outsiders” of the system and created a “well-established discursive economy of identity/difference” (Campbell 1992: 145). Although written before the September 11^th tragedy, Campbell argued that terrorism might be the new battle between “us” and “them” (Campbell 1992: 2).

The Limits of Poststructuralism

The most common criticism raised about the poststructuralist movement is: So what? The poststructural movement, while questioning many of the realist and liberal assumptions, does very little in the way of proposing a theory of their own. I think this critique is important but not the most salient. To reveal the cracks in IR theory is not necessarily a case of “armchair” quarterbacking on the part of the poststructuralists. These “cracks” in the logic reveal problems or lapses with the mainstream IR theories that IR scholars should take seriously. Der Derian does raise interesting insights about the “new” spaces in politics, and Ashley is right that notions of statehood and sovereignty might be problematic. Ultimately, however, poststructuralists do little in the way of providing solutions to the problems they raise. This does not mean creating some parsimonious theory like realism. What it does mean, however, is suggesting ways to break away from the problems they raise, or articulating in a more normative fashion how international politics ought to operate.

Campbell is an extreme version of what plagues the poststructural movement. In an almost polemical fashion, Campbell mocks every American attempt at national security as an instance of creating an insider/outsider paradigm. In doing so he provides virtually no theory for what should make up national security, and what exactly practitioners of international politics ought to do. Methodologically, Campbell assumes that citizens are seemingly “duped” into believing the scare tactics of foreign policy. In a top-down way, Campbell asserts that governments create dangerous threats, and the citizens believe them on almost all accounts. This “social construction” of danger is accomplished on a number of dimensions: loyalty oaths, the Pledge of Allegiance, or committees dedicated to “Americanism” (Campbell 1992: 144). This assertion of socially constructed danger obscures the fact that people are scared for very real reasons. Put simply: this is a dangerous world.[2]

The empirical evidence is also suspect. Although he correctly predicted terrorism as the new “threat,” he felt as though terrorism was once again something created by the state to reaffirm its identity. “…Terrorism is often cited as a major threat to national security,” Campbell wrote, “even though its occurrence within the United States in minimal” (Campbell 1992: 2). Given domestic and global events, the United States’ concern with terrorism seemed certainly legitimate, and not just a social construction. With respect to communism, Campbell similarly oversimplifies. While Campbell is right that the “Red Scare” and McCarthyism were scars on the American political tradition, citizens had every right to be concerned with communism. The Khrushchev Report (1956), which detailed the atrocities of the Stalin era, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's (1973) Gulag Archipelago, an exploration of Soviet labor camps, are just two examples that gave some a reason to be worried. Moreover, as David Horowitz has suggested, if communists were interested in overthrowing the state via nondemocratic means, the government should take action against them.[3]

Moravcsik, Domestic Politics, and IR theory

Although I disagree with most of Campbell’s assessment of international politics, I do agree that domestic politics is important in discussions of foreign policy. Take Moravscik’s “liberal” theory of international politics. Moravscik argues that realism and institutionalism has suffered theoretically because liberal theory “defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold” (Moravscik 1997: 516). These “conditions” are the impact of societal actors, representation of domestic interests by states, and how these states then operate in an international system (Moravscik 1997: 516-520). Unlike Campbell, Moravscik’s liberal theory is “bottom-up,” because “the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics” (Moravscik 1997: 517). The state thus becomes a representative body of these societal actors, and these actors use the state to achieve their goals.

This is an improvement on Campbell, who thinks that the state determines the course of events prior to foreign policy. By denying the agency of the actors, Campbell can conveniently argue that the state does whatever it wants with the implicit consent of the populace. Moravscik’s model, on the other hand, gives actors a voice. The state’s response to terrorism, thus, was informed in part by the public’s desire for security. A major criticism of the Bush administration following September 11^th was their desire for people to buy goods as a way to “help out,” a poor growing economy. It was the citizens, not the state, that wanted to contribute to combat a threat they knew was real.[4]

Conclusion

In this paper I have tried to treat poststructural thought fairly, taking their arguments seriously, and trying to situate their concerns within the current debates in IR. Ashley recommends that we be more aware of “logocentric’ thought, and Der Derian argues that IR scholars should have some answer for the new “spaces” in international politics. Campbell suggests that IR should be aware of the identity/difference paradigm and the role of domestic politics in foreign policy. While the poststructural movement has some interesting things to add to the discipline, ultimately they provide no evidence on how to correct these seemingly glaring problems. Scholars like Campbell, moreover, are threatened by their own methodological and empirical problems. Drawing on the work of Moravscik, I argue that the liberal theory better describes the role of domestic society in IR. In time, poststructuralists might have more impact on the discipline. But until they address some of the questions raised in this essay – and those raised across the discipline -- poststructuralists for better or worse will continue to be a marginal segment in IR theory.

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[1] Der Derian argued that the “anti-Christ Turk, the colonial native, the Soviet threat, and the international terrorist” were just a couple of examples.

[2] Although not scholarly in origin, President George W. Bush has been heavily criticized for “scaring” people about the dangers and threats of the world.

[3] See Horowitz’s Radical Son (1997)

[4] Certainly much has been made about Bush remarks like the “Axis of Evil,” and “You’re with us or against us,” which would seem to jibe with Campbell’s argument of identity/difference. But these remarks followed the public’s outcry against terrorism. Once terrorism does not resonate in the domestic realm, actors will then put pressures on the state to change its policies.

Comparative Politics: Essay on Ukrainian Nationalism

Introduction

Nationalist sentiment in the past decade became prominent in the Yugoslavian wars, Rwandan genocide, Quebec separatism, and Chechnya rebellion. Trouble in these regions proved the profound impact nationalism has, and renewed emphasis on its study in political science. The meaning of the term nationalism and whether nations are primordial, imagined, constructed, or deconstructed has been at the forefront of scholarship for sometime. Other scholars of nationalism have debated the normative aspects of nationalism: whether clinging to national claims is good or bad for societies and states.[1] The purpose of this paper is to think more about the former concern – how nationalism arises and nations are sustained -- than the latter. Particularly I am concerned about how nationalism developed in modern-day Ukraine. The concepts of primodialism, instrumentalism, and social construction figure prominently in this discussion. Although some theorists have argued increasingly for post-modern, social-contructivist views and cynical instrumentalist conceptions, I suggest that primordialism – or the belief that nations are age-old – have merit in the Ukrainian case.

While hard primordialists are virtually non-existent, scholars like Anthony Smith and Robin Cohen have been staunch supporters of soft primordial positions and historian Timothy Snyder has been critical of the constructivist literature. Other social scientists such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, John Anderson, Yuri Slezkine and Keith Darden have critiqued the primordial case, and championed other, more “modern” and “postmodern” views. Although these views often conflict with one another, they do posit an interesting parallel to the Smith, Cohen and Snyder positions. If this paper is a success, I hope to do two things. First, I explore various positions about nation-formation and nationalism held by the different authors and claim that soft primordial positions still have relevancy in the discipline. Secondly, I introduce several positions on Ukrainian nationalism, point out the limitations of modern and postmodern theories in explaining Ukraine, and support finally conclude that Snyder’s historical narrative best explains Ukraine.

Nationalism and the Nation Defined: The Dilemma

Imminent nationalism scholar Benedict Anderson noted that nations, nationalism, and nationalities “proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse [sic]” (Anderson 1991: 3). Conflating the two terms to mean the same thing has confused many a discussion about nationalism and the nation. Of course, the nation and nationalism are two distinct, yet also interrelated, concepts. Put simply, nationalism is the act of promoting a particular nation. A nation, therefore, is the entity, real or imagined, that nationalists seek to promote. Nationalism is best summed-up by Anthony Smith, who argued that certain human populations forged an “ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity,” of their actual or potential nation (Smith 1999: 37). Unfortunately, nationalism has also been characterized as feelings or emotions towards the state, a misnomer that suggests “nations” and “states” to be one in the same (Connor 1994: 40).[2] This is not a major concern of this paper, but something that scholars must contend with.

To define “nation” has been more contentious and ultimately the key source of disagreement among scholars. First, social scientists have debated the extent to which nations are real or invented. While Smith contends that nations are “real and powerful sociological phenomena,” Anderson and Hobsbawm, among others, have suggested that nations are “imagined” and “constructed.” (Anderson 1991, Gellner 1999, Smith 1999, Hobsbawm 1993). Secondly, the issue of time is of great concern. Gellner and other self-described modernists argue that the nation is a rather recent event, coming about in the 17^th and 18^th centuries (Gellner 1999: 32). Smith and Cohen suggest that the nation is much older, and not that modern. I will explore these critiques of the primordialist stance before proceeding to offer a defense of primordial interpretation.

Imagined or Real? The Trouble With the Nation

Contemporary scholarship has found many problems with primordial interpretation. Although many of these theorists disagree with one another, one thing is certain: the nation is an invention, a construction, or an imagined community.[3] Whichever the case, the nations are not “real” in the sense primordialists think, and certainly not old. One camp has taken the side of Anderson, who acknowledges that nations are “imagined communities,” created by print-capitalism and newspaper readership (Anderson 1991: 62). Newspapers printed “local” stories, and advertised goods in the “local” market. Through the process of communicating via the press, readers developed an imagined sense of their community.

Another view depicting the invented quality of nations is instrumentalism. Instrumentalists’ suggest that people create nations and promote nationalism to further their own ends. According to Darden, instrumentalists are often ordinary citizens that adopt certain national viewpoints to achieve their goals (Darden 2002: 6). Others have argued that it is elites – or those at the top – which seeks to manipulate and energize nationalist sentiment. Slobodan Milosevic is a prime example of instrumentalist logic. By rallying seemingly peaceful Serbs and Croats around national rhetoric, his goal of ethnic cleansing is easier accomplished.

Another version of the constructed view is that of Ernest Gellner. Gellner believed that the nation was a product of state-formation in the 18^th and 19^th centuries. Unlike Anderson, Gellner does not believe that nations are simply “imagined communities.” He believes that nations are very real, but very recent (Gellner 1999: 32). Nations “as natural and God-given” is the imagined myth and to think about the nation as a “sleeping beauty” upon need of awakening is great folly (Gellner 1987: 49). For Gellner, the development of the state and the advancement of industrialization destroyed previous cultural, religious and ethnic ties. With this seeming anonymity of person, citizens sought recognition, protection and kinship within the boundaries of the state. “This is what automatically makes people into nationalists,” Gellner noted, “because if there is no congruence between the culture in which they are operating and the culture of the surrounding economic, political and educational bureaucracies, then they are in trouble” (Gellner 1999: 33). Thus, the simple lesson we can learn from Gellner’s story is that statehood invented the nation and nationalists.[4]

As acknowledged earlier, primordial notions of nationality have come under great attack. Most of these critiques were advanced against the “primordial ooze” position. Many nationalists themselves argued that nationality existed through bloodlines, and either one was “born into” the nation or not. Science and anthropology alone have discredited this often times racist and ethnocentric viewpoint about nationality. Soft primordial positions, however, still carry some currency in the debate. Soft primordialists agree that national bloodlines seem spurious and that at some level a degree of construction exists, but these primordialists also grant that ethnic and national bonds are very “real” and also very old. Smith argues that most nations, and their constructors, have a very hard time building nations and states without first a preexisting “ethnic core” (Smith 1987: 262). As he remarks: “The history-less are destiny-less, and this becomes the central dilemma of state-making and nation-building today” (Smith 1987: 244). Cohen, moreover, suggests that primordial identity have such grave practical concerns – life or death potentially – that to deconstruct and dismiss such identity is problematic (Cohen 1999: 10).

My own concern with the “imagined” and “social construction” literature is twofold. One, many of these theories view common citizens as gullible and naive. As the road to nationalism and nation-building marches merrily along, citizens are duped into imagining something they are not. By downplaying the fact that people may choose to reject or accept certain arrangements, social constructivists and instrumentalists assume too hastily an overly determined nation. Two, these theorists have a very narrow view of history, that as Smith has argued, only tells “half the story.” As noted earlier, time matters, and social contructivists and instrumentalists ignore critical historical junctures for more favorable points of departure that (usually) makes their imagined nation a tidy conception. The Ukrainian case will show that both the agency of common citizens, and the history of these citizens, matters.

Ukraine’s Nation and Nationalism: Imagined or Real?

Because of the diverging viewpoints among historians and social scientists about the age of the nation, the way it was created, if it was created, who the nationalists were and where the nationalists were, Ukraine provided an interesting case study for nationalist scholars. Ukraine has also been popular for those interested in proving how new and constructed nationalist sentiment is. Rather matter-of-factly, John Anderson claims that it is the “late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism” that made new studies on the topic enticing to scholars (Anderson 1990: 1). Paralleling the growth of Marxism in Moscow, Ukraine’s nation and nationalist sentiments seemed to be a reaction against Soviet communism (Anderson 7). For J. Anderson, the idea of Ukraine was a product of intellectuals promoting independence from Russia.

Yuri Slezkine also believed that Ukraine developed about the time of Lenin’s revolution in the early 20^th century. Suggesting that the Soviet Union was analogous to a communal apartment, large but with distinctly different inhabitants, Slezkine believed Ukraine was a creation of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. By “inventing” Ukraine and “fostering national cultures… creating national autonomies, national schools… and national languages,” this enabled Lenin to solidify and stabilize his regime (Slezkine 1994: 420). Lenin understood that nationality was a matter of cultural ‘form’ but not political ‘content’ (Slezkine 1994: 434). Therefore, nationalism became the form from which to promote the doctrine. For example, coupled with Ukrainian national myths taught in schools, was the socialism of Marx and Lenin.

Slezkine and J. Anderson both argue for the “invented” and relatively recent existence of Ukrainian nationalism. They also believed that nationalism was a means to an end, or instrumental in purpose. J. Anderson might be right that intellectuals pushed nationalist myths along. Without a doubt, intellectuals can stoke the coals of nationalism. It is also possible that Slezkine is onto something by suggesting that Lenin had profound influence on nations and nationalism in certain Soviet republics. Lenin’s influence cannot be denied. But both arguments were limited with respect to history. What was Ukraine and other regions like before the Soviet Union? Keith Darden has tried to answer that question, and his research suggests that Ukrainian nationalism – while still relatively new – was a pre-Soviet phenomenon.

Darden, like Benedict Anderson, believes that the forms that make mass communication possible enable myths about the nation and nationalism. For Darden, the way nationalist myths spread are through mass schooling and literacy (Darden 2002: 3). However, this mass schooling occurred not in the 20^th century, but the late 1700s and early 1800s, and far removed from the communism of the Soviet Union. He contends that Austria, who fought for control of parts of Western Ukraine and Galicia, created the Ukrainian identity as a way of fighting off rival claims to the territory (Darden 2002: 30). Vienna did this through educating and promoting literacy that created Ukrainian myths but also painted Austria in a favorable light over Polish or Russian aggressors. “Schooling provided an institutional vehicle for legitimizing mass ideas,” Darden asserted, “of which nationalism was one manifestation” (Darden 2002: 10).[5] Darden acknowledges that regions like Galicia where mass literacy was prominent were also the most active in undermining the Soviet Union.[6] This fact alone would seem to give great credibility to this claim.

I think that Darden falls into the same trap that Slezkine and J. Anderson do. Darden’s interpretation is that Galicians were a surly bunch because of one event alone: mass literacy and education provided by Austria. This ignores, however, the tremendous fighting over the region that extended back to the 16^th century. Moreover, Ukrainian nationalism was not isolated to western Ukraine, nor were all those in Galicia sympathetic to Austria and the Hapsburg dynasty. He makes a second mistake, like many social constructivists; by assuming that Galicians were tricked and duped into thinking they were “Ukrainian” or “Austrian.” Increasing literacy rates is certainly an achievable goal and a measurable one. But promoting nationalism is overly ambitious, and I suspect, much more difficult than just teaching kids to read.

Oversimplification by the constructivists and instrumentalists has been less noticed by social scientists, and perhaps that is why constructivism has had such great appeal in the discipline. The cases made are tidy and neat, with clear causation from one event to another. Of course, politics and history are much messier. As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, relevant omissions of key historical detail and vast generalizations cannot piece together the story of nations and nationalism. Although Snyder does not self-identify as a primordialist, or any type of theorist for that matter, he does believe that the social construction literature has a lot to learn from history, and that it is folly to believe nationality comes about from imagination or accident (Snyder 2003: 11). Snyder traces the rise of four “modern” nations – Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Belarus – from the 16^th century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, composed of nobility, Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant origins, became one of the largest nations in modern Europe. By the time the Commonwealth disintegrated in the 18^th century, four distinct nations existed, and four states later arose (Snyder 2003: 1-2). Snyder’s account is one of great detail, and he proves that many nations, including Ukraine, are indeed very old and very real.

Snyder provides several interesting observations about the beginnings of the state we now know as Ukraine. One, he notes that many of the Ukrainian intellectuals and elites who supposedly “created” Ukrainian nationalism were rejected by many citizens. Snyder posits: “The political idea of ethnic nationalism was conceived by elites before it was accepted by peasants: and…the elites often failed to meet ‘ethnic’ definitions of nationhood themselves” (Snyder 2003: 130).[7] Two, the Slezkine view that Ukraine was a Soviet, Leninist creation is also challenged. In fact, imperial Russia recognized Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism some sixty years before, when the 1878 Ems Decree banned the publication and import of Ukrainian works into Russian borders (Snyder 2003: 123). Three, Darden’s claim that Austria’s mass literacy program made Galician and western Ukrainian nationalism stronger than other regions does not appear to be the case. In fact, the prominence of Lemkos[8] in Galicia weakened the “national movement” for Ukrainian independence and proved the strength of nationalism might be in other parts of Ukraine. Furthermore, it was not until the 1930s that Galicia became the “unrivaled center” of the Ukrainian independence movement (Snyder 2003: 139-141).

Conclusion

After reflecting on the downfall of the Soviet Union, Mark Beissinger argued that nationalism seemed to be the key contributor in its demise (Beissinger 2002: 8-9). If we accept this to be the case, then understanding the nation and nationalist sentiment in Ukraine and beyond is of great importance. As I have explained, nations and nationalism are very real and also very old. Instead of viewing the nation as a modern construction, scholars need to turn to history and its details, not isolated political incidents, in order to understand the perilous events of the present. It is also of importance that ordinary citizens are not as easily duped as we might think. Instead, nationalists have a clear, and certainly real, understanding of who they are and who they are not. Echoing Smith, who claims that the “history-less and destiny-less,” Snyder argues that Ukrainians are guided by the past. In some cases, it is a past that dates back to the 16^th century. Hopefully, social scientists will think more critically about the past and reality in future conceptualizations of nations and nationalism.

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[1] See Peter Uvin’s Aiding Violence (2001) and Chris Hedges’ War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning (2002)

[2] By state, I understand it to be what Max Weber suggests as a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force with a given territory” (Weber 1983: 111).

[3] These interpretations have been attractive to many associated with the postmodern movement that has questioned various realities and perceptions about the world, but also attractive to those dissatisfied with primordial conceptions.

[4] Or as Eric Hobsbawm has said: “Nations do not make states and nationalism, but the other way around.”

[5] This use of education was similar, but also very different from Lenin’s. The ‘content’ of Lenin’s story was ideological Marxism, and nationalism was in some ways a byproduct of this goal. For Austria, the ‘content’ was nationalism itself, and this nationalism was the tool used to push out other interests.

[6] Of course, Darden was not the first scholar, nor the last, to understand the importance of Galicia in discussing Ukrainian nationalism.

[7] Indeed, some of the Ukrainian intellectuals were actually of German origin.

[8] Snyder describes the Lemkos as: “East Slavic inhabitants of the hills and mountains… on the Polish-Czech border” (139).